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Evaluation of the Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme



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Evaluation of the Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme

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Abstract

This final evaluation provides an independent assessment of the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) Partnership Programme – a four-year programme that concluded at the end of 2022. It serves the dual objectives of i) evidence and learning on performance; and ii) accountability for results to the donor. The evaluation questions focused on the relevance, effectiveness, results and sustainability of the GNAFC Partnership Programme. The evaluation followed a mixed methods approach, drawing heavily on a desk review of existing documentary evidence, as well as on different project case studies.

The evaluation found that the GNAFC Partnership Programme was built to support the establishment and operation of the GNAFC, to build partnerships to address root causes of crises in a coordinated and evidence-based manner. This remains a relevant objective, especially given the limited resources available in the aid system. It is crucial to focus on targeting those most in need, using the limited resources in the most effective ways. While the design of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, spanning investments in improved analysis of needs, evidence of solutions and better coordination remained relevant, there are indications that this was necessary, yet insufficient, to improve policies and programming.

Building on earlier investments, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has contributed to further improvements in assessment and analysis and has built an important global consensus among partners on the scale of needs. The global public goods produced are strongly appreciated and welcomed but there are important opportunities to improve the content and communication.

The GNAFC Partnership Programme also sought to capture evidence of the results of the country investments that could be used to drive advocacy and improve decision-making at country, regional and global levels. The ability to leverage learnings from these project interventions to inform better decision-making and investment choices at multiple levels did not develop to the extent anticipated. Multiple design factors contributed to this outcome.

Limited progress was however made by the GNAFC Partnership Programme in driving forward coordinated decision-making on crisis response across the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus at global or country levels. While GNAFC membership has broadened, it has not deepened to involve the very senior management needed to broker better alignment or leverage connections between the global and country level coordination efforts.

The evaluation makes six interlinked recommendations to FAO on how it should work with partners to sharpen the strategic vision of the GNAFC and the associated activities. It recommends that FAO continue to invest in, and develop, analytical tools that contribute to the objectives of the GNAFC, as well as advocate for the continued expansion of the IPC coverage as a preferred standard. Working with partners to increase the use of, and relevance to, decision-makers of the global public goods produced with the support of the GNAFC, should remain central. Building on the support provided under the GNAFC Partnership Programme, FAO should continue to support the mainstreaming and further development of the conflict analysis, monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) and Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE) functions.

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Abbreviations

CILSS	Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
ECHO	European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Operations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FEWS Net	Famine Early Warning Systems Network
FSIN	Food Security Information Network
GNAFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises
HDP	Humanitarian-development-peace
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
INFORMED	Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making Programme
IPC	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
KORE	Knowledge Sharing Platform on Emergencies and Resilience
MEAL	monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning
M&E	monitoring and evaluation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RIMA	Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis
TOC	theory of change
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNJP	United Nations Joint Programme
WFP	World Food Programme

Executive summary

Introduction

1. This final evaluation provides an independent assessment of the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) Partnership Programme – a four-year programme that concluded at the end of 2022. This evaluation serves the dual objectives of i) evidence and learning on performance; and ii) accountability for results to the donor. The key evaluation stakeholders include Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) headquarters technical units and managers, FAO country, regional and resilience hub offices, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as implementing and analysis partners including civil society organizations, United Nations (UN) partner agencies, and governmental and intergovernmental organizations.
2. The evaluation followed a phased approach to cover the three main components of the programme. The first phase of the evaluation covered Component 2 of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, and the ten country-level investments that were reviewed or evaluated as separate case studies and synthesized in this report. The second phase of the evaluation reviewed the achievements and contributions of the GNAFC Partnership Programme as a whole. Since Components 1 and 3 had not been covered by data collection during the Phase I, Phase II assessed the work that has taken place in these areas through an extensive number of interviews and building on past evaluations related to the work of the GNAFC Partnership Programme.
3. The evaluation questions focused on the relevance, effectiveness, results and sustainability of the GNAFC Partnership Programme. While the report responds to these evaluation questions, the presentation of the findings is organized against the three components of the GNAFC Partnership Programme as this provides a narrative flow which is more accessible to readers. The evaluation followed a mixed methods approach, drawing heavily on a desk review of existing documentary evidence, as well as on different project case studies.

Main findings

4. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has supported and promoted the use of the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) which has maintained and further strengthened its position as the main source of information for high-level and strategic decisions on acute food insecurity at country, regional and global levels. Progress on institutionalizing IPC has been made at both country and regional levels, but remains uneven.
5. Building on the IPC data, the GNAFC Partnership Programme supported the production of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC), the flagship product of the GNAFC, as well as regional versions for the Horn of Africa and West Africa. These is a well-regarded public good with the data used as a key reference to inform policy and strategy development (rather than programming decisions) by multiple agencies.
6. The narrative analysis in the GRFC is useful, but there are perceptions that the key messages could be strengthened, accompanied by a better communication strategy. Users, especially non expert users, remain confused by the diversity of estimates on food insecurity which are produced by different sources. While these different numbers measure different types of food insecurity and are aligned to different uses, there are opportunities to improve consensus in some areas and/or better communicate the relevance of why multiple estimates are still needed in other cases.

7. The Financing Flows report has been welcomed as a logical and useful complement to the GRFC. The product is still under development and has yet to be fully rolled out so feedback at this stage was limited.
8. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has developed the Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) to measure the impact of resilience programming, although it also continues to be used for household resilience diagnostic analysis. There has been limited interest in institutionalizing the tool outside FAO. The RIMA tool has been reviewed and simplified to address constraints in data collection and analysis. In the country investments, the RIMA methodology was used to measure quantitative changes in resilience capacity, but it was not well suited as a tool to assess the impact of resilience building interventions due to capacity constraints, implementation and methodological limitations.
9. GNAFC Partnership Programme funding played an important role in establishing and institutionalizing anticipatory action within FAO. Based on this, FAO has established itself among the leading organizations in anticipatory action, where it plays a leadership role with strategic partners.
10. Under the GNAFC Partnership Programme, FAO and WFP published regular, consensus briefings on Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity. However, despite increased focus on anticipatory action at country, regional and global levels, triggers and alerts do not always yield early actions and work is still required to define practicable early actions.
11. Investments by the GNAFC Partnership Programme have contributed to broader capacities for conflict analysis within FAO. FAO has also expanded its context/conflict analysis through strategic partnerships with UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in part encouraged and fostered through the linkage with the GNAFC.
12. The country investments were not well selected and designed to maximize learning on the effectiveness of responses to food crises. Shortfalls included the choice of countries, project objectives and non-experimental design. Responsibility for establishing the learning agenda was fragmented within FAO and took time to be determined. This contributed to delays in implementation and limited synergies between the different approaches used.
13. The Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE)-led learning helped to develop processes and capacities for learning that were valued by Country Offices. However, the Country Offices faced significant challenges in delivering on the learning agenda, including overburdened staff. Learning outputs produced principally benefitted the local FAO Country Offices with little evidence of dissemination to, or uptake by, other agencies or countries. Developing a typology of crises and response options is a challenging goal and could not be delivered through the evidence generated by the country investments alone.
14. The GNAFC Partnership Programme provided a significant source of support to strengthening monitoring and learning capacities which benefitted the FAO Country Offices beyond the direct use in support of the country investments and GNAFC.
15. The GNAFC Partnership Programme contributed to strengthening the GNAFC as a coordination mechanism through broadening the membership and enhancing the governance of the network. However, the awareness of, and commitment to, the GNAFC among the very senior leadership levels of partners remains limited.

16. Interest in joining the GNAFC by an expanded group of agencies is growing and these agencies could potentially bring added value to network activities. However, this is set against a continuing lack of clarity over the network aims and modalities and the potential to complicate management.
17. The evolution of the GNAFC has been complicated by the need to position itself in a landscape populated by a growing number of global initiatives to address food crises. It is yet to establish its unique role and contribution.
18. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has been effective in supporting the work of the GNAFC in promoting high-level awareness and periodic dialogue around the scale and trends in food crises. However, it has struggled to articulate shared messages and positions or matched stakeholder expectations for convening coordinated analysis and responses to major breaking emergencies.
19. The improved global analysis of needs provided through the GNAFC Partnership Programme has not in itself been proved sufficient to generate improved overall global funding of food crises as decision-making, which is ultimately political rather than evidence-driven.
20. The GNAFC Partnership Programme piloted approaches to strengthen joint programming and response at country level in collaboration with the Food Security Cluster (FSC). While this generated useful tools and pilot approaches, the FSC mandate remains focused on humanitarian action. Overall, the GNAFC Partnership Programme had little impact on supporting country level coordinated programming and the potential of the GNAFC partners was not capitalized. Consensus is still lacking on how the GNAFC can most usefully support efforts at country level.
21. Support to regional institutions coordinating food crises analysis and response has been welcomed but remained a largely bilateral partnership with FAO and failed to engage the other GNAFC partners in joint solutions.

Conclusions

22. GNAFC Partnership Programme was built to support the establishment and operation of the GNAFC, to build partnerships to address root causes of crises in a coordinated and evidence-based manner. The evaluation evidence confirmed that this remained a relevant objective. With limited resources available in the aid system, there is clearly a need to better target resources across the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus, better targeting those most in need and using the limited resources in the most effective ways by simultaneously addressing both immediate humanitarian needs and the root causes. But while the design of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, spanning investments in improved analysis of needs, evidence of solutions and better coordination, remained relevant there are indications that this was necessary, but insufficient, to improve policies and programming.
23. Building on earlier investments, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has contributed to further improvements in assessment and analysis and has built an important global consensus among partners on the scale of needs. In addition to channelling resources to the IPC, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has added value by providing an important platform to build political commitment around the use of the IPC as a global reference. The global public goods associated with these analyses are strongly appreciated and welcomed but there are important opportunities to improve the content and communication. Improved communication around these global public goods could further improve their influence on decision-makers.
24. While the retrospective global overview of needs provided by the GRFC is important for advocacy and policy development, there is a clear demand for consensus-driven forward-looking figures.

25. The GNAFC Partnership Programme Component 2 sought to capture evidence of the results of the country investments that could be used to drive advocacy and improve decision-making at country, regional and global levels. The ability to leverage learnings from these project interventions to inform better decision-making and investment choices at multiple levels did not develop to the extent anticipated. Multiple design factors contributed to this outcome.
26. A further significant limitation to developing the evidence base on effective responses were the methodological challenges in measuring changes in resilience capacity, unpacking the pathways to change and linking this analysis to decision-makers.
27. The GNAFC Partnership Programme did help to improve the analytical capacity of FAO at country level, with improved tools and capacities for monitoring and evaluation. To varying degrees, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has strengthening monitoring and evaluation processes, and this gained traction within the Country Offices, with significant benefits beyond the country investment projects. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has played an important role in encouraging a systematic way of measuring the impact of projects and in carrying out robust impact assessments. This effectively raised attention in Country Offices about the value of impact evaluation – few FAO projects have previously examined this through the use of treatment and control groups. The approaches introduced have been helpful in encouraging increased rigour in the collection of the evidence of results.
28. However, the more specific attempt to develop methods and approaches to understand and measure resilience through the RIMA tool remained challenging. The RIMA tool has proved challenging for country teams to conduct and analyse even with a degree of continuing headquarters support. The data heavy survey-based approach was expensive and time consuming. This has affected the timeliness, quality and usability of the results. Resilience measurement in this format requires significant funding and it is not feasible to attempt to include this as a standard tool across FAO projects. Further thought is needed on when and where the use of this approach is justified. To make the best use of resources, impact assessments could be conducted periodically at the programmatic, rather than project level.
29. The RIMA tool did help staff with a framework to understand the concept of resilience, as distinct from food security. However, the core resilience capacity index value within RIMA does not alone provide detailed insights into the causal pathways that lead to strengthened resilience. Therefore, complementary approaches still need to be used alongside RIMA as part of a more diverse toolbox and the use of other more user friendly, less costly but equally rigorous qualitative approaches should be further investigated.
30. There are questions over the feasibility of the core GNAFC Partnership Programme goal of developing a typology of crises and responses. Progress in drawing together the evidence to underpin such a typology has been slow, with capacity constraints and methodological challenges. The complexity of potential contexts and potential responses makes a user-friendly typology hard to construct or communicate. There are strong arguments that the choice of response options is so highly context-specific that the ability to develop a useable typology of crises and responses is doubtful. There was little evidence that the country investments provided the best, or sufficient, examples on which to develop such a comprehensive typology. A more pragmatic immediate goal may be a simpler toolbox of solutions with guidelines for quality programming.
31. Critically, there was a missed opportunity to capture learning across the wider FAO portfolio, rather than focusing on a small number of country investments. It would have been preferable to

delink the learning agenda from the direct funding of individual projects and consider funding learning related activities across the FAO portfolio. This would also have allowed for learning from a wider and more strategic selection of projects. Conducting learning across the programme increases the range of evidence that could be drawn on, allowing more appropriate and flexible time frames for learning and maximizing influence across the FAO portfolio.

32. FAO research capacities across different divisions could have been further leveraged and more effectively coordinated to contribute understanding on building resilience to food crises. Partnerships on learning should be more deeply explored, both with other implementing agencies to collectively learn on what works, and strategic partnerships with research institutions on how to learn.
33. At global level there was significant progress under the GNAFC Partnership Programme in strengthening the GNAFC, broadening this from what was perceived to be essentially an FAO-European Union partnership. The GNAFC Partnership Programme helped to bring together a potentially powerful set of global partners – including WFP, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank – to work on food crises. At the same time, the potential of this alliance was not fully realized under the GNAFC Partnership Programme. In particular, the platform was not leveraged to develop consensus positions and coordinated decision-making. Consequently, coordination at global level largely remained at the level of exchange of information rather than alignment of positions or harmonized programming.
34. While this can be partly attributed to the limited evidence delivered through Component 2, there were also evident challenges with the form and function of the GNAFC itself. While the number of members has broadened, participation remains with specific technical focal points within these organizations, rather than a broader cross-organizational buy-in commitment. Furthermore, improved organizational alignment is ultimately dependent on the active commitment of senior leadership in the respective member organizations to the GNAFC to provide the necessary political leadership. The understanding and participation of most senior leadership in the GNAFC remains limited.
35. While the GNAFC Partnership Programme was largely focused on efforts to enhance coordination at global level, it is apparent that the ultimate test of effectiveness is the extent to which it contributed to improved aligned and programming at the country level. However, the GNAFC Partnership Programme failed to define the comparative advantage of the GNAFC in supporting coordination at the country level. The focus and investment of the GNAFC Partnership Programme in country level coordination was modest, with limited progress in developing a model of how the GNAFC might meaningfully support replicable country level coordination initiatives.
36. There was a striking disconnect between the global level coordination efforts and the country (and regional efforts). Country (and regional) level coordination failed to build on the global GNAFC partnerships and there was little evidence that it was attempting to align the work of the European Union, the USAID and the World Bank as a starting point.
37. An important early insight from the analysis of drivers of food insecurity was that the majority of crises are protracted and complex, with large-scale conflict playing a major role. Logically reducing food insecurity requires more attention to conflict mitigation and peace as a solution to food insecurity. However, the GNAFC has struggled to build collective positions on response to conflict-driven food crises.
38. The conflict (context) analysis supported by the GNAFC Partnership Programme has generally proved relevant to improved programming, although much of the analysis was conducted too

late to feed into the initial design of the country investments. This analysis is aligned with the point that FAO has the capacity and mandate for reducing natural resource-based tensions at the community level, incorporating “doing no-harm” as a basic approach. This work is rightly being mainstreamed within FAO as an operational tool by adapting the guidance and approach to this analysis to match differing contexts and Country Office capacities.

39. However, FAO is not a peace actor in itself and has an indirect role in larger-scale conflicts and displacement. Understanding these risks and working towards solutions requires different analytical skills which are not currently included within the GNAFC membership. Furthermore, addressing conflict is clearly ultimately a political, rather than technical challenge. The challenge is to find opportunities to maximize the contribution of the GNAFC with other political forums. However, this is complicated by the fact that many of the key GNAFC members are perceived as political actors in these conflicts, which creates challenges in ensuring the independence, or perceived independence, of the analysis.

Recommendations

Recommendation 1. FAO should work with partners to sharpen the strategic vision of the GNAFC and the associated activities. This includes: i) FAO should advocate to re-focus the GNAFC partners, building a theory of change (TOC) to identify causal pathways of change and underlying assumptions. This should take into account the roles of other networks and initiatives and should inform priority areas of work for the GNAFC; ii) FAO should work with partners to ensure that the GNAFC workplan represents a consensus, based on a strategic analysis of the most important priority actions that contribute to addressing the underlying causes of food crises, the rather than individual agency priorities; iii) FAO should work with GNAFC partners to prioritize activities that improve programmatic coordination among the GNAFC partner agencies at global level, as a basis for, and precursor of, stronger coordination at country level; iv) FAO should work with GNAFC partners to strengthen the analysis of the causes and impacts of major emerging food crises and capitalize on the GNAFC as a platform to plan and advocate for coordinated responses that address the nexus from the outset.

Recommendation 2. FAO should advocate for the governance, membership and participation in the GNAFC to be adapted in line with delivering the refined objectives and activities of the network. This includes: i) promoting the engagement of the FAO senior leadership in the GNAFC, encouraging and supporting their active participation in the senior governance structures and participating in key events, including the launch of the annual Global Report on Food Crises; ii) advocating to other GNAFC members to encourage the active participation of their respective senior leadership in the GNAFC Senior Strategic Group and key events; iii) consider advocating for the inclusion of agencies with a peacebuilding mandate and experience within the GNAFC; iv) encourage and facilitate cross-organizational participation of FAO divisions and units in the GNAFC activities through enhanced collaboration in the development of the respective workplans.

Recommendation 3. FAO should continue to invest in, and develop, analytical tools that contribute to the objectives of the GNAFC. Use the GNAFC platform to advocate for continued expansion of the IPC coverage as a preferred standard – including funding to expand the coverage of acute food insecurity scales and advocating with host governments on the importance of participating in IPC consensus building processes.

Recommendation 4. FAO should work with partners to increase the use of, and relevance to, decision-makers of the global public goods produced with the support of the GNAFC. FAO should work with GNAFC partners to improve the communication of the Global Report on Food Crises and the Financing Flows analysis in formats tailored for different audiences. FAO should work with GNAFC partners and FAO units responsible for other food security data and reports to provide a consistent explanation and presentation of how different food insecurity figures interrelate, including: past, current, forward-looking figures; chronic and acute food insecurity; and data covering differing geographical regions. FAO should work with GNAFC partners to ensure that the Global Report on Food Crises and the Financing Flows analysis are accompanied by consensus-based key messages on the implications and necessary actions including both

the type and amount of resources necessary to make an impact at scale in reducing vulnerability to food crises. FAO should consult with GNAFC partners to consider whether the GRFC mid-year update should continue to be produced. FAO should clarify that the United Nations Security Council brief is a UN authored product without a direct connection to the GNAFC.

Recommendation 5. FAO should continue to invest in, and develop, approaches to gathering and disseminating evidence on the effectiveness of different interventions on addressing the root causes of crises. Building on the support provided under the GNAFC Partnership Programme, FAO should continue to support the mainstreaming and further development of the conflict analysis, monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) and Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE) functions as under the FAO Office of Emergencies and Resilience. Institutionalizing the pilot practice of ring-fencing minimum project funds for monitoring, evaluation and learning purposes should be considered. FAO should reflect on the experience of the GNAFC Partnership Programme to develop a more appropriate and effective methodological approach to evaluating the impact of resilience building activities, and should retain a clear focus on household resilience while taking into consideration a systems approach. Explore the possibilities of working in partnership with specialized actors (academia, think tanks) to implement the learning agendas at corporate and country level. Capitalize on the GNAFC to bring in decision-maker perspectives to setting FAO research agendas and using the GNAFC to disseminate and amplify FAO learnings among external users.

Recommendation 6. A refined and more efficient evaluation approach should be adopted for the United Nations Joint Programmes (UNJPs). The scope of overarching evaluations or reviews of the UNJPs – and potentially other programmatic investments supporting the GNAFC – should be set at the level of the GNAFC rather than the individual programmes. These evaluations should also be conducted jointly with WFP. Other standalone evaluations should be considered to support the strategic and technical direction of key areas, starting with approaches to resilience analysis.

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose of the evaluation and intended users

1. This final evaluation provides an independent assessment of the Global Network Against Food Crises (GNAFC) Partnership Programme – a four-year programme that concluded at the end of 2022. This evaluation serves the dual objectives of i) evidence and learning on performance; and ii) accountability for results to the donor.
2. The key evaluation stakeholders include technical units and managers at the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) headquarters, FAO country, regional and resilience hub offices, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank and the World Food Programme (WFP), as well as implementing and analysis partners including civil society organizations, United Nations (UN) partner agencies, and governmental and intergovernmental organizations. The evaluation will also be of interest to a wide range of other organizations, networks and initiatives working to enhance the resilience of vulnerable populations to food crises or potentially interested in the GNAFC.

1.2 Scope and objective of the evaluation

3. In line with both the FAO evaluation policy and the agreement with the European Union, the GNAFC Partnership Programme requires a final independent evaluation. The evaluation aims at offering an independent assessment of the appropriateness and utility of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, while keeping a forward-looking perspective. It assesses implementation across the three components of the programme at the global, regional, and country levels.
4. The scope of the evaluation covers the period between the start of implementation in June 2018, up until the end of the programme in December 2022. The findings are also contextualized by examining how the GNAFC Partnership Programme built on pre-existing projects, both at country and global level through preceding programme investments, in particular the European Union-funded Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED) programme. Furthermore, the GNAFC Partnership Programme evaluation recommendations are framed with an awareness of the evolving objectives and activities pursued by the GNAFC through subsequent (and often overlapping) programmes (see paragraph 41).
5. The evaluation followed a phased approach to cover the three main components of the programme:
 - i. Phase I – Country case studies: The first phase of the evaluation covered Component 2 of the GNAFC Partnership Programme. This Component had the biggest budget and consisted of country-level investments implemented in ten different countries. In this first phase, the country investments in Somalia, Yemen, Myanmar and the Sahel were evaluated and standalone evaluation briefs produced that complement this evaluation report. The remaining country investments (South Sudan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Palestine, Madagascar, and Cuba) were covered through desk studies. This evaluation report synthesizes these different case studies to evaluate the overall contribution of Component 2 of the GNAFC Partnership Programme.
 - ii. Phase II – Review of GNAFC: The second phase of the evaluation reviewed the achievements and contributions of the GNAFC Partnership Programme as a whole. Since Components 1 and 3 had not been covered by data collection during the first phase,

Phase II assessed the work that has taken place in these areas through an extensive number of interviews and building on past evaluations related to the work of the GNAFC Partnership Programme.

6. The list of evaluation questions are detailed below in Box 1. These evaluation questions follow standard evaluation criteria and were used to inform the design of the evaluation. While the report responds to these evaluation questions, the presentation of the findings is organized against the three components of the GNAFC Partnership Programme as this provides a narrative flow which is more accessible to readers.

Box 1. Evaluation questions

1. Relevance of the GNAFC Partnership Programme

- i. Does the programme logic and assumptions identify the most appropriate pathways to building resilience to food crises?
- ii. To what extent do the thematic areas in the programme build on FAO comparative advantages in building resilience to food crises?

2. Effectiveness of the GNAFC Partnership Programme

- i. Has the GNAFC Partnership Programme enhanced analysis for improved decision-making?
- ii. Has the GNAFC Partnership Programme improved evidence-based knowledge of solutions to food crises?
- iii. Has the GNAFC Partnership Programme built consensus and coordinated responses to food crises?

3. Results of the GNAFC Partnership Programme

- i. To what extent has the GNAFC Partnership Programme contributed to building resilience to food crises?
- ii. Were synergies between the GNAFC Partnership Programme components exploited to enhance this contribution?

4. Sustainability of the GNAFC Partnership Programme

- i. To what extent have relevant capacities for analysing and planning strategies and programmes to build resilience to food crises been institutionalized in FAO?
- ii. To what extent have relevant capacities for analysing and planning strategies and programmes to build resilience to food crises been institutionalized among partners, including governments?

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

1.3 Methodology

7. During the inception stage of the evaluation, an evaluation matrix was developed to elaborate the means of answering the evaluation questions (see Appendix 2). In the absence of a theory of change (TOC) for the programme, an evaluation framework was developed during the inception stage of the evaluation (see section 2.2). This was used to inform the evaluation design by refining the questions and lines of enquiry set out in the evaluation matrix.
8. At the heart of the evaluation design, the evaluation matrix shows how each evaluation question is answered using given sources of data and data collection procedures, including literature and data review, key informant interviews and case studies. These instruments are summarized below.

Phase 1 – Country case studies

9. The country investment evaluations and desk studies were guided by a shared evaluation framework. A common evaluation matrix ensured standardization and alignment across the parallel studies and facilitated the ability to synthesize findings.
10. The data collection tools used in these case studies were also harmonized. Primary data was collected through key informant interviews and focus group discussions with beneficiaries. Field visits also allowed direct observation of assets and activities. Additional interviews with FAO headquarters and regional stakeholders were also carried out with personnel responsible for the GNAFC Partnership Programme management and delivery, as well as other implementing partners commissioned to support the programme.
11. Secondary data collection and analysis consisted of a review of existing documentary evidence and data, including a range of project document, annual and mid-year progress reports, project outputs, project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) data, complaints and feedback mechanism data and learning products.
12. Findings at country level were validated, tested and refined with the evaluation's interlocutors through validation and debrief workshops.

Phase II – Review of GNAFC

13. The evaluation draws heavily on a desk review of existing documentary evidence. The evaluation leveraged information from recent evaluations of different activity areas associated with the GNAFC Partnership Programme, this includes: i) the 2022 evaluation of the second phase of the Integrated Phase Food Security Classification (IPC) Global Strategic Programme; ii) FAO's desert locust response real-time evaluation in 2022, that covered the European Union's investments that took place through the GNAFC Partnership Programme; and iii) the 2020 Evaluation of the Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making (INFORMED) programme that provided useful benchmarks for the analytical activities under Component 1. In addition, an external review of the GNAFC was funded by the European Union in early 2023 (ASRAFS, 2023).
14. The literature review also included the programme documents and progress reports, a range of technical and analytical outputs produced with support from the GNAFC Partnership Programme and the learning products. Additional relevant documents, both internal FAO documents and other external documents, were gathered following interviews with key informants.
15. Information from international, regional, national and local level stakeholders was collected through semi-structured key informant interviews. The evaluation ensured that the sample of project stakeholders consulted equitably represent the various possible perspectives, including an adequate variety of geographic contexts. Approximately 64 interviews were conducted (Appendix 1). All key informant interviews were treated as confidential. For note-taking purposes, the interviews were recorded and automatic transcripts generated.
16. The evaluation undertook two light, remote case studies of Yemen and South Sudan. These formed a part of contribution analysis to understand what the major recent developments have been in terms of building resilience and the extent to which the GNAFC Partnership Programme has contributed to these changes. These studies utilized an outcome harvesting approach, identifying what major changes had occurred at country level and then assessing the contribution of the GNAFC Partnership Programme activities compared to other factors.

17. A survey instrument was drafted to gather views from the users of the global goods produced by the GNAFC. However, it became clear that several similar surveys had already been recently conducted by the Food Security Information Network (FSIN) and USAID. Therefore, rather than producing an additional survey, the results of these existing surveys were drawn on in this review.
18. The evaluation adopted a systematic approach to analysis, ensuring validity and transparency in the relationship between findings, conclusions and recommendations. Findings from diverse evidence streams were consolidated in an evaluation grid that triangulated the findings from different sources against the questions in the evaluation matrix. The Evaluation Team came together at the analysis stage to confirm and debate emerging analytical themes and conducted a debriefing to test and discuss common findings in November 2023.
19. The evaluation engaged closely with the GNAFC Partnership Programme management team in headquarters throughout the process. These stakeholders are central to shaping the evaluation to inform decision-makers' needs, providing evidence on performance and the ownership of recommendations.

1.4 Limitations

20. The evaluation experienced a number of challenges and limitations. First, there has been a considerable evolution in the vision, funding and activities of the GNAFC over the evaluation period with several overlapping programmes. The GNAC Partnership Programme has been succeeded by new United Nations Joint Programmes (UNJPs) funded by the European Union. Stepping up the Engagement of the Global Network, a joint programme with WFP that aims to provide complementary resources on areas which have been identified as crucial for a full-scale operationalization of the GNAFC. The Global Network: A Game Changer has run concurrently with Stepping up the Engagement of the Global Network and is similarly jointly administered with WFP (see paragraph 41).
21. The GNAFC activities were typically discussed and reported on collectively by stakeholders without reference to the specific programme funding vehicle. The European Union develops one work plan for the year ahead for the GNAFC and treats the different programmes as part of one action. This presented a challenge to the evaluation in terms of maintaining the focus on the GNAFC Partnership Programme. To manage this risk, the evaluation analyses and reports on the specific objectives and activities of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, including activities co-financed by the UNJPs, but not activities that were solely financed by the UNJPs. At the same time, while the report does not evaluate the UNJP activities, it did gather a necessary degree of information on these to ensure that the recommendations remain relevant to the evolving nature of the GNAFC.
22. Second, the GNAFC Partnership Programme contributed financial support to a few activities that were co-financed by other donors and FAO contributions, including the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, anticipatory action and conflict analysis. This presented a challenge in distinguishing the specific contribution of the GNAFC Partnership Programme to the overall achievements of these functions. This was mitigated by ensuring the analysis is contextualized with a recognition of the partial contribution by the GNAFC Partnership Programme. Where possible, the analysis focuses on the specific role and contribution of GNAFC Partnership Programme funding, especially where it was targeted to specific activities.
23. Third, the evaluation subject matter presents several methodological challenges. The higher-level objectives of the GNAFC Partnership Programme concern the impacts of evidence and advocacy

on decision-making. This is commonly recognized as difficult to evaluate. This was addressed through using a theory-based approach to the evaluation so that the plausibility of the approach and continuity in the causal chain was assessed. It was complemented by outcome harvesting to identify major policy and programme changes and attribute the role of the GNAFC Partnership Programme in driving observed changes. Data availability was also a constraint. The final reports for 2022 from the GNAFC Partnership Programme and the programme terminal report were not yet available to the evaluation and the level of detail in financial records did not make it easy to determine exactly what activities had been funded through the GNAFC Partnership Programme.

24. Fourth, the initial evaluation plan was overly cumbersome and poorly adapted to the needs of stakeholders. Considerable time and effort was invested in conducting a number of sequential evaluations, building towards a comprehensive synthesis. However, this approach proved overly complicated, with the multiple project evaluations being poorly justified, leading to delays in delivering the programme evaluation. A more timely and lighter review would have better matched the strategic needs of managers.
25. Importantly, setting the scope of the evaluation to the GNAFC Partnership Programme was a considerable limitation in terms of the potential utility of the evaluation. Key stakeholders, especially those outside of FAO, were far more interested in the performance of the GNAFC as an entity rather than programmatic delivery. Broadening the scope of the GNAFC as a whole, rather than one programme, would have been far more appropriate and allowed the timely inclusion of evidence on a wider set of ongoing activities highly relevant to decision-makers.

1.5 Structure of the report

26. Following this introduction, section 2 presents the background and context of the evaluation. Evaluation findings are presented in section 3, followed by conclusions and recommendations in section 4.
27. The report is also accompanied by the following appendices:
 - i. Appendix 1. People interviewed
 - ii. Appendix 2. Evaluation matrix
 - iii. Appendix 3. Additional information on GNAFC components
 - iv. Appendix 4. Evolution of the strategic approach

2. Background and context of the evaluation

2.1 Description of the programme

2.1.1 Rationale, objectives and activities

28. FAO and the European Union have a longstanding record of collaboration on supporting food security and nutrition information systems for improved decision-making, with continuous financial support provided by the European Union to FAO since 2009. Most recently, the European Union-funded investments in the generation and use of food security information included the INFORMED Programme, a 2015–2019 initiative that strengthened and consolidated FAO’s work in food security, and the 2016–2022 Food and nutrition security impact, resilience, sustainability and transformation (FIRST) Programme that promoted inclusive policy dialogue at country level.
29. GNAFC was founded by the European Commission for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO), the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO), FAO and WFP at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit. The GNAFC was conceived as “*an alliance of humanitarian and development actors united by a commitment to tackle the root causes of food crises through increased sharing of analysis, knowledge and strengthened coordination in order to promote collective efforts across the Humanitarian, Development and Peace (HDP) Nexus.*” (FSIN, 2023).
30. The underlying rationale for the GNAFC rested on the evidence of food insecurity becoming more pervasive. A large proportion of humanitarian requirements remained unmet in 2017 and longer-term investment were well below projected needs. Needs were also becoming more complex with no single humanitarian/development actor able to provide the right responses in isolation. Consequently, the GNAFC sought to step up joint efforts to address food crises along the humanitarian-development nexus and raise global awareness and commitment from all relevant actors.
31. The FAO programme was launched in July 2018 and ran until the end of 2022, with the aim to “substantially increase the resilience of vulnerable people’s livelihoods to food crises, through its contribution to the GNAFC, which will play a central role in translating evidence-based analysis into policy change at global and country level.” (GNAFC, 2018) This programme aimed to have a catalytic effect in supporting the work of the overarching GNAFC. It built on the previous European Union programme investments, including INFORMED.
32. The GNAFC Partnership Programme was aligned to FAO’s then Strategic Programme 5 (SP5): “Increase Resilience of livelihoods to threats and crisis” and achieving SP5 Outcome 5.1 (Countries adopted or implemented legal, policy and institutional systems and frameworks for risk reduction and crisis management); Outcome 5.2 (Countries made use of regular information and early warning against potential, known and emerging threats), Outcome 5.3 (Countries reduced risks and vulnerability at household and community level) and Outcome 5.4 (Countries prepared for and managed effective responses to disasters and crises). The GNAFC Partnership Programme remains well aligned to the current strategic plan, specifically aligned supporting Sustainable Development Goal 2 (SDG 2) to end hunger.
33. The GNAFC Partnership Programme objectives were to increase the level of coordination and the global governance around food security analyses, promoting a more systematic use of such analyses for strategic planning and coordination of sustainable solutions to food crises and facilitating a more coordinated and effective global response to food crises. The three programme

components, their outcomes and intermediate outcomes are presented in Table 1 and the activities under each component are summarized below. For more additional information, please also see Appendix 3.

Table 1. Global Network against Food Crises Partnership Programme components

	COMPONENT I	COMPONENT II	COMPONENT III
OUTCOMES	Analysis and Information	Country Level Investment & Learning	Joint/Coordinated Response
	Food security, resilience and risk analyses enhanced at all levels for improved decision making	Evidence-based knowledge about context-specific practical solutions to food crises increased through innovative country-led investments	Evidence-based joint/ coordinated responses that promote sustainable solutions to food crises are strengthened at all levels
INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES	1 Quality of food security, resilience and risk data and analyses improved	6 Evidence-based and country-led innovative resilience investments are prioritized and implemented in selected countries	8 Mechanisms to promote global policy attention and coordinated response to food crises established / strengthened
	2 Tools are responsive to evolving analytical developments and challenges	7 Evidence-based knowledge on context-specific sustainable solutions to food crises enhanced	9 Joint programming and response at country and regional levels strengthened
	3 Institutionalization of analytical tools and processes is strengthened at global, regional and national levels		10 Monitoring, evaluation and Learning, Knowledge Management quality and support are assured across the action
	4 Consensus-based analyses and tools are enhanced to better support global efforts to respond to food crises		
	5 Analyses are efficiently communicated and accessible to all stakeholders for effective decision support		

Source: FAO and EU. 2018. *European Union Delegation Agreement Global Network against Food Crises Partnership Programme FOOD/2018/399-213. Appendix I – Description of the action FOOD/2018/399-213.* Rome and Brussels.

2.1.2 Programme management and partners

34. Programme implementation was originally coordinated within FAO’s Strategic Programme on Resilience (SP5) mechanisms by a core management team based at FAO headquarters in Rome. Responsibilities of the management team included ensuring quality, coherence and efficiency of the delivery, as well as dissemination of programme outputs. Following the subsequent reorganization of corporate functions the programme moved under FAO’s Office of Emergencies and Resilience. Implementation was supported by several Office of Emergencies and Resilience teams:¹ Strategic Positioning, Country Support, Programme and Results (Anticipatory Action; Conflict and Peace Unit), global Food Security Cluster (FSC), needs assessments/Data in Emergencies Hub team, and monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL). In addition, it collaborates with other FAO technical divisions, for instance FAO’s Agrifood Economics and Policy Division (Food Systems Resilience and Resilience Measurement, IPC), FAO’s Market and Trade Division (Early Warning and Hunger Hotspots), and FAO’s Rural Transformation and Gender Equality Division (social protection). The implementation through technical teams was further complemented by contributions from regional hubs.
35. Partnerships have played an important role across the programme. Under Component 1, key technical partnerships have included: WFP, the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET); with the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in Eastern Africa; with the Food Security

¹ The nomenclature of these units has changed over time – this listing is taken from the implementation period.


Information Network who were responsible for preparing the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC); and partnerships with Interpeace on conflict analysis.

36. Under Component 2, various country level partnerships were established, most critically with government partners. FAO worked in close collaboration with the line ministries in all countries to deliver the projects, and in many cases the government was also a direct beneficiary of the projects in terms of capacity strengthening activities. Under Component 3, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has engaged key stakeholders involved in addressing food crises at the global and regional level (European Union/DG International Partnerships [INTPA]-ECHO, USAID, World Bank) other key donors and technical agencies (notably WFP and the United Nations Children's Fund [UNICEF]). The GNAFC Partnership Programme also partnered with the Global Food Security Cluster to promote joint and coordinated food security responses at the country level.

2.1.3 Programme financial resources

37. Based on the initial project document, Component 2 accounted for approximately 57 percent or EUR 40 467 825 of the EUR 70 853 055 budgeted for the overall GNAFC Partnership Programme.² While a substantial sum in total, this was shared by ten projects working in 12 countries, meaning that the amounts budgeted per country were relatively modest. Component 1 was the next largest (EUR 23 633 378 or 33 percent), followed by Component 3 (EUR 6 751 852 or 10 percent). Figure 1 below presents the proportions of individual allocations.

Figure 1. Funding allocations across GNAFC Partnership Programme components



Source: FAO and EU. 2018. *European Union Delegation Agreement Global Network against Food Crises Partnership Programme FOOD/2018/399-213. Appendix I – Description of the action FOOD/2018/399-213.* Rome and Brussels.

38. European Union financing was complemented by FAO and other partners' additional resources contributing to the same objective. This was estimated at USD 6.6 million of staff time per year, including relevant global, Regional and Country Offices in the FAO project document.
39. In October 2020, an amendment was signed which resulted in the addition of EUR 25 million for locust response in the Horn of Africa (control and livelihood rehabilitation). The locust control activities that fell under the GNAFC Partnership Programme Component 2 have been evaluated as part of FAO's overall desert locust response through a real-time evaluation. This project was


² Final allocations may be different and will need to be obtained from final reports.

contracted under the GNAFC Partnership Programme for administrative purposes but had limited interrelationships with the strategic goals of the GNAFC.

2.1.4 Evolution of the strategic approach

40. Following the high-level event organized by the GNAFC in April 2019, extensive dialogue occurred with key partners (FAO, WFP, the European Union, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UNICEF) and resulted in an agreement on the implementation approach – the so-called “3X3 approach” of GNAFC (see Figure 2 and GNAFC, 2021b). Under this, the GNAFC seeks to reduce vulnerabilities associated with acute hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture and food systems. The GNAFC aims to work across three interlinked dimensions at the global, regional and national level, on “Understanding food crisis”, “Strategic Investment in food security and nutrition”, and “Going beyond food” by fostering political uptake and seeking coordination with actors and sectors working across the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus.

Figure 2. GNAFC 3x3 approach



Source: GNAFC. 2021. *Governance of the Global Network Against Food Crises*. Rome.

41. While this builds on many of the activities included in the GNAFC Partnership Programme, it also introduced additional directions and themes. While this change in strategic thinking changed the context for implementing the GNAFC Partnership Programme, it did not lead to a revision of the GNAFC Partnership Programme logframe itself. Instead, the expanded directions were addressed through the two subsequent and concurrent UNJPs (see Table 2).³

³ Currently, two UN Joint Programmes [namely UNJP I - Stepping up the engagement of the GN (2020–2025) and UNJP II - Fulfilling the mandate of the GN (2022–2025)] provide a further European Union contribution to support the establishment of GNAFC’s activities.

Table 2. European Union programme support to FAO for food security information and decision-making related programmes (2015–2024)

Programme	European Union funds	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	
Information on Nutrition, Food Security and Resilience for Decision Making Programme	€21m												
Food and Nutrition Security, Impact, Resilience, Sustainability and Transformation Programme	€37m												
Global Network Against Food Crises Partnership Programme	€70m (+€25m for desert locust)												
Stepping up Engagement of the Global Network Against Food Crises	€28m												
Fulfilling the mandate of the Global Network Against Food Crises	€21m												


Source: Authors' own elaboration based on information on FPMIS.

42. The UNJPs broadened the scope of the GNAFC in several ways, including:
- i. expanding the analytical work under the first dimension of the Global Network;
 - ii. supporting expanded investments at regional and country level;
 - iii. analytical work to identify options to improve food systems' sustainability and growth potential in food crisis contexts.

2.2 Evaluation framework

43. The evaluation is theory-based and framed around an evaluation framework for the GNAFC Partnership Programme. There was no overall TOC developed in the GNAFC Partnership Programme document itself. The complexity, scope and limited clarity on the GNAFC Partnership Programme pathways limited the ability to fully elaborate an inclusive TOC that lays out detailed pathways of change accompanied by assumptions. However, building on the logic of intervention presented in the programme documents and reports, the evaluation framework is presented in Figure 3. The use of this evaluation framework helps to illustrate and test the causal pathways from activities through to results and provides a framework to synthesize the somewhat disparate components into a coherent synthesis.

Figure 3. Evaluation framework for the GNAFC Partnership Programme



Source: Authors' own elaboration.

3. Evaluation findings

44. The evaluation findings are organized below in relation to the contribution made by the GNAFC Partnership Programme to the three components of the programme: improved analysis, evidence of what works and promoting coordinated responses (see Figure 3).

3.1 Contribution to enhancing analysis for improved decision-making

EQ 1: What contribution has the GNAFC Partnership Programme made to enhancing analysis for improved decision-making?

45. Component 1 of the GNAFC Partnership Programme is the analytical dimension of the programme which aimed to provide quality analysis and evidence to relevant national, regional and global stakeholders for decision-making on programming and policy. This component encompassed food security, resilience and risk analysis as well as conflict analysis. More specifically, analysis deriving from the IPC, Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA), Early Warning Early Action (anticipatory action) and conflict analysis. The main findings relating to the progress in developing these analytical tools are discussed below, alongside an assessment of the added value of associating these investments with the GNAFC.

Finding 1. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has supported and promoted the use of the IPC which has maintained and further strengthened its position as the principal source of information for high-level and strategic decisions on acute food insecurity at country, regional and global levels.

46. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has been used to channel significant financial support from the European Union to the IPC Global Support Unit housed in FAO. This has been complemented by other donor support to the Global Support Unit, notably from USAID and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Commonwealth Office of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Therefore, the achievements of the IPC over this period can be partly attributed to GNAFC Partnership Programme funding.
47. Donor agencies continue to rely heavily on the IPC analysis of acute food insecurity as a preferred source of information to guide top-line allocations of humanitarian resources to address acute food insecurity as it is credible and delinked from the interests of implementing agencies. It is used in communication and advocacy, to mobilize humanitarian resources; and, to a lesser extent, to inform policymaking. Where it is available, it is also the primary source of information on food insecurity for the annual Humanitarian Needs Overviews and Humanitarian Response Plans at country level (FAO, 2022a). In contrast, due to limited resources for humanitarian response in national budgets, national governments use the IPC more to inform longer-term food security strategies. These patterns reflect similar findings on how the IPC was used in previous evaluations (FAO, 2019).
48. The association with the GNAFC Partnership Programme has explicitly helped to promote the use of the IPC as a consensus reference figure over the reference period. Through the GNAFC Partnership Programme, an agreement was reached between the chief economists of WFP and FAO that, where IPC figures were available, these would be used as the agreed figures in preference to agency specific data. Reportedly because of the GNAFC, the IPC has gained prominence in policy discussions both in New York and at global level. The G7 Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact has endorsed the IPC as the standard for declaring famine since 2021.

Finding 2. Progress on institutionalizing IPC has been made at both country and regional levels, but remains uneven. There have been challenges to maintaining government engagement in several cases which constrained the application of the IPC in recent high profile food crises.

49. GNAFC Partnership Programme investments have supported the increase in individual capacities at country and regional level in the use of the IPC. Table 3 presents a summary of the number of analysts trained. In addition, an IPC community of practice was set up consisting of the IPC Global Support Unit and partner agencies providing space for sharing of guidance, tools and space for dialogues among members (FAO, 2022b).

Table 3. Number of IPC analysts (2019 and 2020)

Level of analyst	2019	2020	% change
IPC Level 1	1 173	1 560	+34%
IPC Level 2	25	38	+52%
IPC Level 3	31	35	+13%

Note: The GNAFC Partnership Programme annual report for 2022 was not yet available, limiting the data available for this report. Source: GNAFC. 2022. *Annual Progress Reports for 2020 and 2021*. Rome.

50. A baseline assessment (FAO, 2022a) carried out in 2020, conducted to inform the Global Strategic Programme 2023–2026, using five agreed dimensions of institutionalization⁴ suggested variable satisfaction with institutionalization of the IPC at country level – ranging from Zimbabwe scoring 33 percent and South Sudan scoring 81 percent.⁵ The 2022 evaluation of the IPC case studies noted factors influencing institutionalization included the underlying strength and transparency of government, a balance between international and national leadership in situations of conflict, a recognition that no “one size fits all” and the degree of institutionalization of IPC in global partners. The suspension of the IPC by host governments in highly food insecure countries including Ethiopia and South Sudan in 2021 illustrates the continuing and significant challenges to institutionalizing this consensus-based approach (FAO, 2022a).
51. There was mixed progress in institutionalization at the regional level. In West Africa, the IPC collaborates with the Cadre Harmonisé to ensure comparability of findings. In the Horn of Africa, IGAD uses the IPC outputs but currently lacks the capacity to engage with other IPC partners, support the implementation of the IPC at country level (especially when challenges are faced) and promote optimal use of IPC findings to inform decisions. Under the Southern African Development Community, Vulnerability Assessment and Capacities Assessments is the main institutionalized multisectoral analytical framework used by Member States for food security analysis. Key informants noted that efforts by IGAD to only intervene in such a case in Ethiopia were unsuccessful and that the Southern African Development Community was also unable to influence the recent suspension of IPC by the Government of Zimbabwe.

⁴ The five dimensions are: i) Governance: decisions are taken transparently and independent of political interference. The IPC is embedded into national structures and institutions; ii) Membership and participation: all relevant sectors and institutions take part and gaps in capacity are identified and addressed; iii) Integration and synergies: the Technical Working Group has developed relationships with relevant food security institutions and processes and works to ensure cooperation and coherence; iv) Funding: the IPC receives funding from national and regional as well as international bodies. v) Processes: the IPC is conducted with anticipation and timeliness so that analysis is conducted in optimal conditions. Results are released in a timely manner and without political interference.

⁵ This score was shortly prior to the breakdown in consensus which resulted in the publication of two IPC analyses.

Finding 3. Increased coverage of the IPC across all major food crises countries, and further methodological developments were seen as important to the GNAFC supported global analysis and advocacy.

52. The increased responsibility of the GNAFC in alerting the world to famine has highlighted the importance of maintaining and extending IPC in countries where there is a high risk of famine. The latest Global Report on Food Crises identified 53 countries as in food crisis, but the IPC was only present in 41 of these (FSIN and Global Network Against Food Crises, 2023). In the remaining countries the analysis consequently relies on alternative measures which are generally less preferred and lack comparability with IPC estimates of food insecurity.
53. A recent evaluation of the IPC (FAO, 2022a) confirmed ongoing methodological improvement supported through the programme. At the same time, users of the IPC highlighted a number of areas for further improvement to meet their information and decision-making needs. These were:
 - i. greater agility and responsiveness in IPC analyses, for example through strengthened real-time monitoring to capture the fast-moving context and dynamic trends in food insecurity;
 - ii. improved early warning through IPC projections to inform anticipatory action;
 - iii. more contextualized IPC analysis to better reflect conditions in different countries;
 - iv. more intersectoral analysis between IPC food security analyses and sectors such as water, sanitation and hygiene, and health;
 - v. greater disaggregation of IPC results; and
 - vi. strengthened understanding of the relationship between chronic and acute food insecurity.
54. Some of the areas for improvement have or are being addressed in ongoing work. A recent evaluation of the IPC (FAO, 2022a) also confirmed ongoing methodological improvement supported through the GNAFC Partnership Programme. For example, improved early warning formed part of the revision to the IPC 3.1 manual produced in 2021 with increased rigour in processes and methods for determining projections for early warning. However, there is also recognition of the limitations of the use of IPC for early warning given the infrequency of IPC analyses which are annual or biannual in nature. The 2018 evaluation of the IPC (FAO, 2019) also noted that projections had never been tested retrospectively and this continues to be the case.

Finding 4. Building on the IPC data, the GNAFC Partnership Programme supported the production of the Global Report on Food Crises and regional versions for the Horn of Africa and West Africa. These is a well-regarded public good with the data used as a key reference to inform policy and strategy development (rather than programming decisions) by multiple agencies.

55. The flagship product of the GNAFC is the Global Report on Food Crises. Since 2017, the GRFC is produced on an annual basis by FSIN on behalf of the GNAFC, with a mid-year update. The GRFC draws on IPC data, supplemented by additional sources including FEWS NET, WFP's Consolidated Approach for Reporting Indicators of Food Security (CARI) and Humanitarian Needs Overviews where the IPC data is not available to present and analyse trends in food crises. The data in the report is complemented by an analytical narrative on the drivers of crisis. The GNAFC promotes the dissemination of the report, effectively drawing in participants to high-level events timed to coincide with the launch of the report.

56. A core feature of the GRFC is its consensual nature as the FSIN provides a multipartner platform to reach consensus.⁶ This consensus adds credibility. However, the process is cumbersome and expensive, leading to the withdrawal of some partners in drafting the report due to the heavy work demands. Consensus has been hard to achieve with an unresolved tension between the GNAFC and some FSIN members over the scope of the report (how many countries to include), the data sources used and the emphasis on humanitarian and development needs.
57. The GRFC was found to be used principally as a tool to support reporting, advocacy and policy. The report is said to be well used by both UN agencies and Member States in New York. It is extensively referenced in the Secretary General's reports to the Member States and subsequent UN General Assembly humanitarian omnibus and Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) humanitarian affairs segment resolutions for the last three years. In principle these resolutions inform both the Member States and the UN system priorities. The GRFC data and key talking points are also widely referenced by other agencies and the media, although it was noted that the usage of this as a key reference was not consistent even within individual agencies where a variety of sources may be drawn on. Some individual academics noted the report was a valuable teaching and research tool, although it is not widely recognized among the academic community.
58. The GRFC was not a primary source of data for programming decisions. The GRFC data tends to be historical, and decisions on allocations tended to rely on current assessments and forward-looking data, such as FEWS NET, typically at country level. The GRFC data did have potential relevance to the general prioritization of resilience building investments in protracted crises, as these crises, by definition, change more slowly over time. For example, supporting European Union decision-making on resilience building was part of the original design intent.
59. Regional versions of the GRFC are also produced by IGAD and CILSS,⁷ with strong local ownership. There is a mutually beneficial relationship with the GRFC – the global team support the regional publications with the consensus data, communications and the publication process, while the regional teams provide analysis and insights on the localized drivers, which feed in to the global report narrative. The regional reports are well regarded by users and provide a useful opportunity as a platform for discussion on food crises, including cross-border solutions. A regional report has not been developed in southern Africa, in part as it doesn't fit well with the agricultural calendar.

Finding 5. The narrative analysis in the GRFC is useful, but there are perceptions that the key messages could be strengthened, accompanied by a better communication strategy.

60. In addition to the data, the narrative analysis in the GRFC report was also found to be useful. Users who classed themselves as "non-technical experts" commented that the narrative was useful in explaining the dynamics of food security and helping their understanding. As the reports now draw on seven years of data, the trend analysis is seen as particularly useful in monitoring progress towards goals including the Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 Agenda. This analysis also contributed to policy insights on the main drivers, as one stakeholder commented: "*if you are interested in building resilient communities, it's not just about weather and climate, but about addressing conflict and insecurity*". However, it was also noted that the same key drivers tend to appear in the report every year.
61. While the GRFC report itself is produced by the FSIN, the GNAFC usually releases a communique to accompany the report, drawing out key policy messages. However, reaching agreement among members has proven challenging. Stakeholders noted that messages often remain generic and

⁶ Originally 17 agencies, but this dropped to 16 with the withdrawal of FEWS NET in 2023.

⁷ The first regional report for West Africa and the Sahel was released in 2023, so strictly outside the evaluation time frame.

the messaging around the GRFC often reflected agency-specific perspectives rather than a common agreement. This was particularly challenging for the European Union and USAID who have to take on political considerations alongside the technical issues.

62. Users consistently perceived under investment in a communications strategy around the GRFC, compared to over investment in the technical aspects. While it is important for users to have confidence in the rigour of the underlying analysis, most of them do not have time to absorb the full report. Busy decision-makers, such as the New York based diplomats, asked for much shorter syntheses, with easily digestible key messages that were well tailored to a specific audience.

Finding 6. Users, especially non expert users, remain confused by the diversity of estimates on food insecurity which are produced by different sources. While these different numbers measure different types of food insecurity and are aligned to different uses, there are opportunities to improve consensus in some areas and/or better communicate the relevance of why multiple estimates are still needed in other cases.

63. There are several different figures relating to food insecurity made available by various organizations and reports. These include data on acutely food insecure populations (as seen in the GRFC) compared to those chronically food insecure (most notably presented through the annual State of Food Insecurity in the World [SOFI] report). Furthermore, the number of acutely food insecure may be backward looking (as presented in the GRFC), as the current numbers of food insecure or as forward-looking projections. Additionally, the numbers of acutely food insecure may be presented as a “global figure” but are often aggregated for different sub-sets of countries, further complicating the picture.⁸
64. Non-technical users reported significant confusion over these different numbers, with a desire to have a “single” agreed figure. Different numbers are clearly needed for different purposes, and it is unrealistic to expect a consolidation into a single consensus figure. However, there are opportunities to improve the communication of these numbers and how they interrelate, and how different numbers relate to different decision-making purposes.
65. Related to this, the timing of the release of different figures is important. The simultaneous release of the WFP forward looking estimates at the same time, and in the same forum as the GRFC figures in April 2020 caused significant confusion and reputational damage for the GRFC, especially as the WFP figures were an order of magnitude larger. Nor is the release of the mid-year update of the GRFC, the hotspot report and the Financing Flow analysis at a similar time seen as helpful. In contrast, publishing the GRFC in April and SOFI in September helps to distinguish the products, although it was still reported that users require an explanation each time of what the differences are.
66. The GRFC mid-year update was viewed as contributing to this confusion. As updates are not available for all countries mid-year, the subset of countries included in the mid-year analysis is typically smaller than the annual report.⁹ This has led to a common misconception that the mid-year update showed declining needs and an improving situation. Furthermore, the report is often released at a very similar time as the Hot Spots Report, creating further confusion. Given the policy orientation of the GRFC, there was also limited interest in a mid-year update.
67. A further layer of confusion exists when multiple numbers, estimating exactly the same food insecure population, are issued by competing agencies and sometimes in different units in the

⁸ There was a common misconception that the GRFC provided full global coverage.

⁹ For example, in the last year there were 58 countries included in the GRFC, of which only 48 were considered in the mid-year update.

same agency. In particular, estimates of projected needs in a specific crisis may be available from competing sources, including: WFP, the IPC, the UN Humanitarian Needs Overview, the World Bank and the Global Alliance for Food Security dashboard and the host government. While the GRFC has done an important job in building consensus around the “historical” figures, there is still a lack of consensus and perception of bias in the forward-looking forecasts. As these forward-looking estimates are key to response planning, several key GNAFC members expressed a desire to use the GNAFC as a platform for developing consensus on these numbers.

Finding 7. The Financing Flows report has been welcomed as a logical and useful complement to the GRFC. The product is still under development and has yet to be fully rolled out so feedback at this stage was limited.

68. A Financing Flows report was introduced under the GNAFC Partnership Programme in 2021, with the data collection and analysis supported by development initiatives. While the GRFC report shows how many were in need, this report aims to track the food and agriculture response, examining both humanitarian and development flows. Some interesting preliminary findings have emerged from the analysis, highlighting the gross imbalance between humanitarian and development spending in areas affected by food crises. It is also apparent that a disaggregated national analysis could be very useful. For example, an analysis of financing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo showed that while the agricultural financing was much larger than humanitarian spending, it was targeted to more stable parts of the country and did not focus on resilience building.
69. This is still a relatively young product and the methodology is still being refined. While humanitarian data is relatively well organized, accessing the development data has been more challenging. It is often only available with a delay of several years, and incorporating national expenditures, remittances and private sector investment alongside official development assistance (ODA) has been challenging. The pilot reports have not yet been widely disseminated and it is unclear what use will be made of it. However, stakeholders were broadly interested in, and supportive of, this publication.

Finding 8. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has developed RIMA to measure the impact of resilience programming, although it also continues to be used for household resilience diagnostic analysis. There has been limited interest in institutionalizing the tool outside of FAO.

70. The development and implementation of the RIMA tool continues to rely almost exclusively on financial support provided through the GNAFC Partnership Programme. This tool addresses an important and widely acknowledged gap in the measurement and analysis of household level resilience capacity. While originally developed as a household resilience diagnostic analysis, the RIMA has been developed under the GNAFC Partnership Programme to assess project contributions to building resilience at household level.
71. During the implementation of the GNAFC Partnership Programme RIMA used to design baseline, midline and endline reports for the ten country investments which were part of Component 2 of the GNAFC Partnership Programme. There has been a degree of interest among Country Offices in exploring the use of RIMA in other countries for impact measurement with the team at headquarters reported providing support to an additional 15 countries in the use of RIMA.
72. The RIMA continues to be used for other purposes by a variety of users. However, despite RIMA capacity building efforts, external uptake remains modest. While the African Union has endorsed RIMA for monitoring progress against Article 6 of the Malabo Declaration on Accelerated Agricultural Growth and Transformation for Shared Prosperity and Improved Livelihoods (African

Union Commission, 2014) its uptake has been slow. Key informants reported that January 2024 will be the first biannual report to include the RIMA index for 34 of the 54 countries in Africa following capacity building investment with the African Union since 2017.

73. The FAO Regional Resilience, Emergencies and Rehabilitation Office in West Africa/Sahel has developed several strategic engagements with stakeholders at the regional and subregional level (ECOWAS, African Union, CILSS) to promote the use of RIMA on a larger scale. IGAD independently reviewed RIMA among other tools such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)'s Community-Based Resilience Analysis (CoBRA) and determined a mixed methods approach is better suited to measure resilience, rather than a reliance on RIMA alone (IGAD, 2020). Key informants reported that members of the Southern African Development Community are only just seeking to understand the RIMA tool specifically linked to reporting requirements for the African Union Malabo Declaration and requested and received FAO support through two workshops. Beyond these examples, the tool remains little used outside of FAO, other than by academic and research institutions.

Finding 9. The RIMA tool has been reviewed and simplified to address constraints in data collection and analysis. The introduction of "Shiny RIMA" has automated the computation of key resilience indicators, helping to address the limited availability of expert analysts. However, calculating an index value in itself, has not helped to improve the understanding of the drivers of resilience at country level.


74. A major challenge to the wider uptake of the RIMA tool is that it relies on expert skills for analysis, which have largely remained in the headquarters-based team. The complexity of the original RIMA tool was a key challenge noted in the INFORMED evaluation of 2021 (FAO, 2021a). To make the tool more accessible to partners, development efforts have sought to simplify the tool and make it more user friendly, including the launch of the Shiny RIMA online platform to calculate the resilience index (FAO, 2021b). Shiny RIMA is said to considerably simplify analysis for the production of the resilience capacity index. While RIMA is seen as a useful tool in highlighting the intersectoral nature of resilience, the index value alone tells users little about the pathways from the specific project interventions to changes in resilience capacity. Consequently, the analysis risks being seen as somewhat abstract by users.
75. The simplification and standardization of data collected through the introduction of the RIMA short questionnaire was noted to have reduced data collection costs, but at the same time limited the explanatory power of the tool. Some stakeholders argued that RIMA short questionnaire provides insufficient variables to probe the relationships that drive resilience. Stakeholders contrasted this with the much richer datasets being collected by FAO's Data in Emergencies Hub which offered more potential to support detailed resilience analysis.¹⁰
76. Other optional questionnaire modules and refinements have been developed to complement the short-RIMA questionnaire. This included a module to capture exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic, adding the Food Insecurity Experience Scale and an updated social protection module. RIMA was also adapted to new requests, such as the specific set of indicators under the Green Climate Fund requirements (FAO, 2021b). There is a continued evolution of the methodology which is being developed to support the analysis and monitoring of food systems resilience. Work in this regard is being developed in collaboration with Cornell University and incorporates a new conceptual model for resilience that factors in production, processing and markets, a fundamentally different approach to household level RIMA analysis.

¹⁰ While the RIMA short questionnaire collects 26–29 variables, FAO's Data in Emergencies Hub collects between 100 and 150 variables across 26 countries.

Finding 10. GNAFC Partnership Programme funding played an important role in establishing and institutionalizing anticipatory action within FAO. Based on this, FAO has established itself among the leading organizations in anticipatory action where it plays a leadership role with strategic partners. The Anticipatory Action team used other anticipatory action-focused global networks to leverage their influence.

77. Key informants noted that FAO’s work on anticipatory action was kick-started through investments from the INFORMED programme. This investment allowed testing of the approach through implementation, including providing the evidence for the impact of the approach, and through the return-on-investment studies. This support continued under the GNAFC Partnership Programme which succeeded INFORMED. In 2020/2021, leveraging the GNAFC Partnership Programme funding, the Anticipatory Action team secured German Government and ECHO funding, which has enabled significant and continued capacity building in this approach.
78. Key informants noted that anticipatory action is now mainstreamed in FAO's work, as evidenced by its inclusion in FAO Country Programming Frameworks, and as part of corporate and regional priorities the corporate aim to dedicate up to 20 percent of FAO emergency and resilience portfolio by 2025 to anticipatory action. Figure 4 shows the growth in expenditure in supporting anticipatory actions through the Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) anticipatory action window.

Figure 4. Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities funding for anticipatory action



Source: SFERA. Annual reports 2018–2022. Rome.

79. In addition to SFERA funding, FAO continued to advocate for a system wide shift towards anticipatory action against food crises. Countries selected in 2021 for piloting Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)-anticipatory action pilots included the Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, Malawi, the Philippines and South Sudan, with FAO as a main contributing partner, both technically and operationally (FAO, 2022b). However, anticipatory action has yet to fulfil the FAO Director-Generals’ aim that it makes up 20 percent of FAO emergency and resilience portfolio by 2025.
80. FAO continued to co-chair with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the Inter-Agency Standing Committee on El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO)

analytical cell that oversee the standard operating procedures for early action to El Niño/La Niña episodes, determining event probability and impact and an analysis of high-risk countries. Informants noted that an area to develop could be a combined group for large events that brings together key agencies and donors to reach consensus on the need for early action based on informed and available evidence.

81. FAO has also hosted or co-hosted a series of global and regional dialogue platforms on anticipatory action, which facilitate exchange and dialogue among experts and practitioners in the field. In 2020, FAO hosted a discussion on anticipating food crisis to undertake a stock-take of efforts to make a shift to anticipating food crises. Key partners that attended included WFP, the World Bank, OCHA, the IPC Global Support Unit, FEWS NET, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and the Start Network. The process led to the adoption of IPC projections as anticipatory action triggers for the OCHA-CERF pilots (FAO, 2021b). FAO strengthened its partnership with WFP by developing an FAO-WFP Anticipatory Action Strategy aimed at scaling up anticipatory actions to prevent food crises. In November 2022, actors gathered for a second time under their joint auspices to advance discussions and agreements on the principles and criteria of key topics for scaling up anticipatory action in food crises contexts (FAO and WFP, 2023).
82. At regional level, FAO has established a strategic partnership with IGAD's Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, Interpeace and the Conflict Early Warning Response Units at country level in Uganda, South Sudan and Kenya. This has been strengthened through joint analysis conducted on the drivers of food crises in the Karamoja cluster (FAO, IGAD and Interpeace, 2023). Key informants highlighted that the introduction of anticipatory approaches in conflict or violent settings remains a big challenge.
83. FAO has formed strategic partnerships at the global level on anticipatory action with like-minded organizations. FAO is part of various partnerships, including the Anticipatory Action Task Force (Anticipation Hub. n.d.) with WFP, OCHA, FAO, IFRC, Welthungerhilfe, the Start Network and the Anticipation Hub. In 2021, this partnership maintained anticipatory action on the international agenda through meetings and events such as the G7 Famine Prevention and Humanitarian Crises Compact, the High-Level Dialogue in Brussels, COP26 and 27 and the European Humanitarian Forum leading to a number of donor, government and organization pledges to scale up and institutionalize anticipatory action (FAO, 2022b). However, the GNAFC was not a main platform used by the Anticipatory Action team to leverage their results.

Finding 11. Under the GNAFC Partnership Programme, FAO and WFP published regular, consensus briefings on Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity. However, despite increased focus on anticipatory action at country, regional and global levels, triggers and alerts do not always yield early actions and work is still required to define practicable early actions.

84. Building on the introduction of joint FAO-WFP donor briefings, the Hunger Hot Spots report was introduced under the GNAFC auspices to replace two separate risk monitoring publications by FAO and WFP. This consolidation has been welcomed by users, providing a harmonized and credible forward-looking analysis. The report is well received, particularly by humanitarian actors responsible for programming decisions. Users referred to using it in talking points and briefings. It is seen as less relevant to development and policy actors. However, a degree of confusion was reported among non-technical users on how the hotspot numbers related to other GNAFC data, as well as agency data. The frequency of the information is also an issue as the periodic nature of the publication does not always align well with individual countries seasons, thus limiting its relevance for informing anticipatory action.

85. Informants reported that the Anticipatory Action team works on an ongoing basis with Country Offices to support them in producing anticipatory action protocols, developing a procedure that links early warning information (including triggers) with finance and anticipatory action. The triggers developed are context specific and there is a need to keep that specificity while harmonizing the way the triggers are set up as much as possible.
86. In Southern Africa efforts are focused on harmonizing triggers and thresholds at regional level and exploring methods for last-mile information dissemination and digitalization of information. FAO is part of a Regional Anticipatory Action Working Group which is working together with countries and regional partners (including the Southern African Development Community) to scale-up anticipatory action work in the region.
87. Efforts are ongoing with regards to raising awareness of anticipatory action and disaster risk reduction. Through collaborative efforts with IFRC, FAO is holding several workshops with media and policymakers in Uganda and South Sudan to deepen understanding of anticipatory action. Efforts are also ongoing in integrating anticipatory action into disaster risk management plans.
88. However, informants also suggested challenges to funding anticipatory actions. In the Horn of Africa, FAO was able to mobilize USD 10 million in resources to address drought conditions which should have led to a scaled-up response. Despite the availability of indicators such as precipitation, health and status of rangeland, as well as producing early warning scenario analyses, response was limited. This occurred despite joint FAO/WFP advocacy efforts, including a briefing in Geneva calling for immediate funding for anticipatory actions (FAO, 2022b). In contrast, informants suggested that the locust response was a demonstration of an at scale anticipatory action.

Finding 12. Conflict (or context) analysis was not systematically included as part of the country investments, with the choice delegated to the individual Country Offices, leading to missed opportunities to strengthen programming. The conflict analyses, when done, produced interesting insights, but the poor sequencing of this analysis, and in some cases poor execution, limited the use of findings by country investments.

89. During the inception phase, the FAO Conflict and Peace Unit¹¹ and subregional conflict advisers¹² provided support to four countries in conducting programme conflict sensitivity clinics; two of these countries also commissioned conflict studies by independent organizations, while six of the ten country investments included a conflict “module” in the baselines and endlines (see Table 4). Stakeholders made clear that the conflict module in the baselines and endlines was no substitute for a full conflict analysis. The content of this module was not systematic, and the detail left to countries to decide. It included a relatively small number of indicators that contributed to a context/conflict analysis and the measurement of resilience through the resilience capacity index.

¹¹ The Conflict and Peace Unit, until start of 2022, was jointly under the Agrifood Economics and Policy Division – Office of Emergencies and Resilience, and is now fully under the Office of Emergencies and Resilience. It provides support to Decentralized Offices across a number of thematic and technical areas, including conflict analysis, conflict sensitivity and contributions to sustaining peace. The Conflict and Peace Unit also provides technical coordination to Conflict Sensitivity Programming Specialists in the Regional Resilience, Emergencies and Rehabilitation Office in West Africa/Sahel, Resilience Team for Eastern Africa and FAO Jordan (for the Near East).

¹² Three conflict sensitivity programme specialists were recruited providing real-time conflict analysis to support programming in two regions (East Africa and Central America).

Table 4. Conflict analysis by country

Country	Conflict sensitivity programme clinic	Independent conflict analysis or assessment	Conflict module in baseline/endline
Cuba	None	None	None
Ethiopia	None	None	5 questions
Madagascar	None	None	None
Myanmar	Jun-19	Jul-22	None
Sahel	Jun-20	None	Burkina Faso, Mali: 3 questions Niger: Full conflict module
Somalia	Nov-19	Sep-21	9 questions
South Sudan	None	None	2 questions
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	None	None	None
Palestine	None	None	10 questions
Yemen	Apr-19	None	4 questions

Source: Authors' own elaboration based on information from the FAO RIMA and Conflict and Peace Unit.

90. The uptake of the “offer” for a conflict analysis was dependent on the initiative and capacities of the Country Offices. In general, the uptake appeared to be stronger in larger, better capacitated, offices. The application of the headquarters- driven approach was most coherent in Somalia. The project was the first GNAFC Partnership Programme project that undertook a complete conflict-sensitive programming process, including: i) context/conflict analysis; ii) Programme Clinic; iii) implementation of conflict-sensitive recommendations in terms of adaptive management and elaboration of a specific conflict-sensitive MEAL framework; and iv) peace and conflict impact assessment follow-up study, and endline evaluation of the peace contributions of the European Union’s Pro Resilience Action.
91. The country investment was also credited with introducing conflict analysis into FAO in the Sahel and supporting studies in Yemen. For the Sahel, both conflict sensitivity programme clinics, country conflict analyses and a synthesis analysis focusing on Liptako Gourma were also completed. With the coordination and support from the FAO Regional Resilience, Emergencies and Rehabilitation Office in West Africa/Sahel conflict sensitivity adviser, the Sahel country investment conducted conflict studies in the three countries (the Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso) as well as a regional synthesis to identify conflict-sensitive intervention areas. In all cases, the Country Offices lacked the capacity to directly implement the conflict analyses and relied on either contracted consultants or institutions.
92. However, in general, the conflict studies rarely benefited the country investments themselves, principally as the analysis was only available after implementation had started. While the GNAFC Partnership Programme supported conflict analyses in Yemen, the conflict analyses do not appear to have been utilized by project managers due to both quality concerns and being conducted too late in the project. In the Sahel, the studies didn’t significantly inform the investment because of timing but were reported to have demystified conflict analysis for the team involved.
93. There was evidence that earlier analysis could have contributed to improved implementation. In Myanmar, a conflict sensitivity assessment was commissioned in 2021 through a local company with the purpose of understanding the project’s contribution to peacebuilding (RAFT Myanmar,

2021). The findings pointed out gaps in the project's design with respect to conflict sensitivity. While implemented using the "do-no-harm" approach, a more robust conflict analysis at the project preparation phase would have enabled the country investment to design interventions that specifically aimed to actively promote and contribute to social cohesion in the long term. In South Sudan, the installation of a new water point resulted in pastoralists altering their normal movements and tension over the use of the water as well as the pasture. It was commented that this should have been part of any conflict sensitive project design and a key "do no harm" approach to the project.

94. Very limited interactions were reported in other countries including Cuba, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Madagascar, in either introducing conflict analysis or increasing awareness and acceptance of the importance of integrating conflict sensitive approaches. As stakeholders noted, persuading over stretched Country Offices to integrate conflict analysis appears challenging. One stakeholder commented "*Lots of burdens and processes are thrown on Country Offices, but they have to do a lot with very little support*".

Finding 13. Investments by the GNAFC Partnership Programme have contributed to broader capacities for conflict analysis within FAO. FAO has also expanded its context/conflict analysis through strategic partnerships with UN and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in part encouraged and fostered through the linkage with the GNAFC.

95. Investments by the GNAFC Partnership Programme, both in staffing the Conflict and Peace Unit and the subregional adviser roles in Amman, Nairobi and Dakar, have been critical in the increased capacity of FAO to undertake context/conflict analysis – an analytical capacity that FAO had previously lacked. Over 35 country sensitivity programme clinics have been undertaken, supporting a number of countries.
96. A recent follow-up report on the Evaluation of FAO's role and work on the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus (FAO, 2023a) noted a number of areas where progress has been made with regards to context/conflict. These included the increased frequency and use of context/conflict and risk analysis to inform project and programme development including in anticipatory action, implementing the IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action (2016) and increased attention to intersectionality in guidance on conflict-sensitivity.
97. FAO has developed a number of partnerships including with Interpeace both at corporate and regional level that have been supported through the GNAFC Partnership Programme. This included support to FAO's development of context/conflict analysis guidance and tools. A good example of the collaboration was the support to context/conflict analysis and programme design in Somalia (see Box 2).

Box 2. Interpeace partnership with FAO in Somalia

In 2018, years of drought in Somalia had resulted in the deterioration of irrigation structures and access to water resources had become precarious. Both these factors were contributing to recurring community conflicts. An FAO-led project sought to respond by partnering with Interpeace's Somalia team. A participatory context/conflict analysis identified drivers of conflict and outlined opportunities to address them. A programme clinic then pooled the expertise of FAO, Interpeace staff, Somali government representatives and conflict affected citizens to recommended adjustments to the project that would ensure it was peace responsive. These included pursuing transparent and fair procurement processes, recruiting more unemployed youth and strengthening water governance mechanisms. Within two years, the project had improved irrigation and water management, but also contributed to peace and security by strengthening local ownership, improving inter-community relations and promoting livelihoods.

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

98. Key informants also highlighted the improved partnership with WFP on conflict under the auspices of the GNAFC Partnership Programme. FAO and WFP report to UN Security Council members on Security Council Resolution 2417, providing a biannual brief to the UN Security Council. While the demand for the United Nations Security Council brief was made directly to FAO and WFP, rather than through the GNAFC, resources from the GNAFC Partnership Programme were used to contribute to the analysis and the brief is therefore included in the progress reports. Given the political nature of the report potentially relating to human rights violations, there are clear sensitivities in any suggestion that the report is a GNAFC product. There is a requirement for the report to remain impartial and avoid any perceived conflicts of interest with the states represented in the core GNAFC, as it is branded as FAO/WFP.
99. A further example of positive collaboration with WFP was joint analysis work undertaken in Haiti, which aimed to provide identification of joint-programming entry points for responses to food insecurity, natural resources management and rural development within the context of recurrent shocks and linkages with political instability and chronic insecurity (GNAFC, 2021a). Informants noted that while such analysis was a good example of where FAO and WFP should be moving towards in terms of joint or at a minimum shared analysis to inform programming, it had not immediately led to changed or new programming.
100. Further examples of partnership included FAO's work with IGAD's Conflict and Early Warning unit to produce an analysis (FAO, IGAD and Interpeace, 2023) on the interactions between conflict, food security, climate change and migration and displacement in the Karamoja cluster. Key informants reported that at the corporate level, FAO is now represented at the Deputy Director-General level for the UN Peacebuilding Strategy Group (PSG). FAO is now also consistently involved at the technical level in the Peacebuilding Contact Group and participates in discussions within the, not only around the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), but also in more strategic policy-related discussions.

3.2 Contribution to evidence-based knowledge of solutions to food crises

EQ 2: What contribution has the GNAFC Partnership Programme made to improved evidence-based knowledge of solutions to food crises?

101. Outcome 2 of the GNAFC Partnership Programme sought to increase evidence-based knowledge about context-specific solutions to food crises. Under this Component, innovative country-led interventions – modelled on the European Union-supported Pro Resilience Action funding mechanism – were financed. While the country investments had direct benefits for participants, a key driver behind learning from the country investments, within the GNAFC Partnership Programme logic, was the European Union INTPA's desire to make a more impactful use of the European Union's Pro Resilience Action funds. Therefore, the country investments were designed to identify potentially successful interventions for scaling-up in different contexts.
102. Country investments supported ten interventions in 12 countries: Yemen, Cuba, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Myanmar, the Sahel (with a multi-country project including interventions in the Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso), Somalia, South Sudan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Palestine. The individual country investments had varying thematic and technical focus areas with a different mix of activities used to address the challenges and opportunities of the specific country context. The activities included as part of the country investments were classified into five thematic areas: strengthening institutions; strengthening information management; enhancing beneficiary skills; supporting household livelihoods; and innovation and new approaches.

103. A EUR 25 million uplift to the GNAFC Partnership Programme was also used to finance the desert locust intervention (see Box 3) under this Component.

Box 3. Desert locust intervention

Over the course of 2020–2021, the world witnessed the most devastating desert locust upsurge of the past 25 years. FAO and its partners mobilized more than USD 243 million since January 2020. The response included three key pillars: i) curbing the spread of desert locusts through control and surveillance operations; ii) safeguarding livelihoods and promoting recovery through livelihood protection and farmer re-engagement packages; and iii) coordination and preparedness of the rapid surge support. The European Union contributed EUR 25 million to this response as an addendum to the GNAFC Partnership Programme Component 2 – country investments.

An FAO evaluation found that FAO had made clearly observable contributions to the reduction of swarm and hopper band sizes and damage to crops and livelihoods assets in the Horn of Africa and Southwest Asia; and helped to guard against the spread of locust movements into the Sahel, while identifying several areas for potential improvement in the future.

While an important intervention, the desert locust response was not associated with the broader objective of the GNAFC Partnership Programme in developing a typology of crises and response options.

Source: Authors' own elaboration.

Finding 14. The country investments were not well selected and designed to maximize the learning on the effectiveness of responses to food crises. Shortfalls included the choice of countries, project objectives and non-experimental design.

104. The programme document was explicit in the goal of using the country investments to develop a typology of food crises paired and evidence-based response options that would guide future investments and “can be replicated by relevant national, regional and global stakeholders” (FAO, 2018). However, this was not clearly reflected in the selection of projects. Project identification and approval was rushed and the importance of learning as part of these investments was not adequately communicated to the Country Offices. Consequently, stakeholders suggested that the country investments were primarily used to finance unfunded projects that addressed FAO and European Union response priorities, with only an *ex post* consideration of what learning might flow from the investments.
105. While countries were to be selected based on “their resilience focus, lessons learned that can potentially be scaled up for a typology of interventions, clear links with drivers of food crises and regional coverage”, there were both inclusion and exclusion issues against these criteria. Country investments were only present in three of the eight biggest food crises – some interviewees commented that based on needs they would have expected countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Afghanistan to be included. Equally, country investments in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Cuba did not feature in the long list of 53 food insecure countries identified in the 2017 Global Report on Food Crises.
106. The design of investments was decentralized to the FAO Country Offices, in conjunction with the European Union Delegation, with support from the Office of Emergencies and Resilience team at FAO headquarters. Consequently, country investments were often designed in ways that responded to national development strategies and priorities. These frequently sought to improve economic growth or nutrition, rather than build resilience. For example, in the case of the

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, the interventions aimed to improve the productive capacity to guarantee and improve availability and access to food as well as improve household diets. It was understood that the project was designed earlier and only linked with the GNAFC Partnership Programme at a later stage. Stakeholders did not see this as a strategic way to facilitate linkages between humanitarian and development work. In the case of Cuba, the primary objective was promoting a diversified and healthy diet rather than resilience. In Palestine, the primary objective was poverty reduction, rather than resilience building. While development focuses on economic growth and poverty reduction, resilience building focuses on reducing risk and vulnerability.

107. On the other hand, a good example of the way that the country investments aimed to increase resilience was the use of Cash+ approaches in Yemen, which combined relief with livelihood recovery. Once households' immediate needs are met through unconditional cash transfers – (supporting dignity and choice) the synchronous “plus” in FAO’s Cash+ approach builds on this stability to ensure families not only have cash, but also the inputs, assets, training and support they need, helping them to protect, recover, adapt and diversify their livelihoods. However, even when the objectives were aligned, the design of the project did not compare the outcomes of various combinations of interventions, such as cash alone, inputs alone or cash alongside inputs, which would have maximized learning.
108. The inclusion of thematic investments in information management systems and institutional strengthening was questionable as the short time frame of the country investments meant several investments were not finalized by the end of the project (see Table 5). Nor were the learning tools adapted to capture any information on the impacts of these interventions. Potentially important activities may not have been included in the programme. For example, despite the GNAFC Partnership Programme funding the work of FAO's Rural Transformation and Gender Equality Division in shock responsive social protection, no country project investments were made in this area.¹³

Table 5. Delivery of project outputs by country

Country investment	Strengthening institutions	Strengthening information management	Enhancing beneficiary skills	Supporting household livelihoods	Innovation and new approaches
Yemen: Establish an environment allowing the Yemenis to improve resilience.					
Somalia: Facilitate recovery and build resilience in accessible areas of Lower Shabelle by addressing selected structural causes of vulnerability.					
Sahel (Burkina Faso, the Niger, Mali): Strengthen the resilience of agropastoral systems and contribute to sustainable peacebuilding in the Sahel.					

¹³ The funding from the GNAFC funds the partial staff costs of the technical lead on social protection and resilience, which is the primary profile responsible for a team of specialists providing technical assistance to country teams on the topics of adaptive/shock-responsive social protection, linking social protection to humanitarian cash and anticipatory action, among other topics.

Country investment	Strengthening institutions	Strengthening information management	Enhancing beneficiary skills	Supporting household livelihoods	Innovation and new approaches
Myanmar: Strengthen resilience of vulnerable households affected by conflict and natural disasters in Rakhine State.	Yellow	Red	Grey	Green	Grey
South Sudan: Improve food and nutrition security for vulnerable groups, while applying resilient agricultural livelihood strategies.	Yellow	Grey	Green	Green	Yellow
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of): Improve food sovereignty and security through the recovery and diversification of family farming production capacity.	Yellow	Yellow	Yellow	Grey	Yellow
Palestine: Contribute to the sustainable improvement of the food security and livelihood resilience of farmers and fishers affected by the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip.	Grey	Grey	Green	Green	Grey
Madagascar: Strengthen the resilience of local communities and the most vulnerable households to prevent and mitigate hazard impacts and ensure food and nutrition security.	Yellow	Grey	Yellow	Green	Green
Cuba: Strengthen community resilience for food and nutrition security.	Grey	Yellow	Yellow	Green	Grey

Notes: Green = achievement of >75% of output targets, Yellow = 25–50% of targets and Red <25% of target. Evaluator assessment drawing on FAO reporting in 2021 annual report complemented and/or substituted by evidence from the country evaluations and desk studies. Source: Authors' own elaboration.

109. Furthermore, there were questions on whether beneficiaries were selected due to their vulnerability or development potential – baselines in several countries (the Niger, Yemen and South Sudan) reported relatively high levels of acceptable food security as measured by the food consumption score: 78 percent in the Niger, 70 percent in Yemen and 62 percent in South Sudan (TANGO International, 2021a). It was also noted that baseline levels of food security and resilience were higher for project beneficiaries than non-beneficiaries, raising questions on whether project activities were well targeted to the more productive households, rather than more vulnerable households.

Finding 15. Responsibility for establishing the learning agenda was fragmented within FAO and took time to be determined. This contributed to delays in implementation and limited synergies between the different approaches used.

110. The GNAFC Partnership Programme inception report set out a learning agenda with four key steps: i) framing the learning with specific learning questions linked to the programme's outcomes, approach and/or key thematic areas; ii) arrangements for gathering evidence; iii) communicating the learning through a variety of learning products; and iv) reinjecting the outcomes of learning in programme's implementation through adaptive management. The full list of learning questions is presented in Appendix 4.

111. Support to the learning agenda was provided by several different teams in FAO headquarters, with different objectives and approaches. Responsibilities were shared between the Office of Emergencies and Resilience Monitoring Evaluation Accountability and Learning team (most countries received considerable support from headquarters in the design and analysis of the baseline, endline and impact studies from the resilience analysis team) and the FAO KORE team, which played an increasingly prominent role during implementation in developing the learning agenda concept and facilitating the learning process at country level as a complement to M&E activities, through learning briefs that answered the country specific learning questions.¹⁴
112. Developing a learning approach and framework, which was new to the division (teams and Country Offices involved in GNAFC), took time and was therefore not fully formulated in the programme document. Furthermore, the fragmented responsibility for learning hampered the rollout of a cohesive approach and contributed to significant delays in implementation. This compounded the challenges of the timeline, with short-term interventions not well suited to building resilience and insufficient time between implementation and data collection to capture the benefits of many interventions.
113. Overall, there was no clear assignment of a lead person (or unit) for the learning agenda and as one stakeholder commented it *"fluctuated in the space between the MEAL and KORE teams"*, leading to a critical disconnect between those framing the questions, those collecting the data and those providing the answers. This left some of those tasked with answering the learning questions working retroactively, struggling to make sense of the questions and working with insufficient or overly anecdotal evidence.
114. Furthermore, the relatively small size of the projects meant that several Country Offices were initially unwilling or unable to devote a lot of effort and resources to learning and remained heavily reliant on headquarters. Some Country Offices remained resistant to engaging on the learning agenda, leaving a tenuous linkage between the country and global learning. To support the realization of the learning agenda, the GNAFC Partnership Programme enhanced the MEAL capacities at headquarters to support the country investments. In each country, between 5 and 7 percent of the total budget was ring-fenced for monitoring, evaluation and learning purposes by the Country Offices.¹⁵ However, this budget appeared to have been used largely for M&E rather than supporting learning and knowledge specialists.

Finding 16. The RIMA methodology was used to measure quantitative changes in resilience capacity. However, the RIMA methodology was not well suited as a tool to assess the impact of resilience building interventions due to capacity constraints, implementation and methodological limitations.

115. The MEAL and RIMA teams led the design of baselines and endlines to measure impact and provide quantitative evidence on changes in levels of resilience associated with the project interventions. The standardized format of these impact studies, based on the RIMA methodology, intentionally facilitated cross-country studies on the effectiveness of resilience building interventions. These impact evaluations of the country investments were designed to provide robust evidence of the outcomes associated with the project activities. This was achieved by comparing changes in food security levels and household resilience among those receiving livelihood support and other trainings to those in a control group.

¹⁴ Given their technical expertise, the Conflict and Peace Unit team were called in to help address conflict-related learning questions in South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel.

¹⁵ Normally there is no requirement for FAO to dedicate a specific level of resources to these activities in project budgets.

116. Baselines and endlines have been conducted, albeit with delays, in all countries except Ethiopia.¹⁶ However, the completion of the baselines, endlines and impact evaluations proved challenging. An underlying problem appears to be the variable, and often limited capacities for M&E in the Country Offices. Stakeholders saw the RIMA as a complex tool for the country team to manage, even with the support provided by headquarters specialists. FAO personnel reported that it was challenging to use the specific RIMA methodology as it involves complex design and analysis processes which need advanced statistical skills. All Country Offices, to various degrees, lacked the local capacities to design, administer and analyse the survey.¹⁷ A centralized external quality assessment (TANGO International, 2021a) identified a range of quality issues with the baselines.¹⁸ This included issues with sampling approaches,¹⁹ indicator definition and the analysis.
117. All countries have remained reliant to various degrees on the RIMA team at headquarters to support the analysis and interpretation of results. Given the small size of this team, this has been a significant overall constraint. While the RIMA team has made repeated efforts to simplify and automate the analysis, for example by introducing the “RIMA short questionnaire” and “Shiny RIMA”, these have only been partially successful in reducing demands on the limited headquarters expertise.²⁰ As of the end of 2023, impact assessments have so far only been published for 5 of the 12 countries (Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Myanmar, Palestine and Somalia).
118. A number of challenges were noted in the approach used. In several countries, the endlines were being conducted at the same time as field activities were still being finalized. This made it problematic to attempt to measure impact. For example, as the infrastructure works in Somalia were not even finished at the time of the evaluation, it was difficult to assess long-term effects on the resilience of beneficiaries. Similarly, the water infrastructure rehabilitation in Yemen plausibly has longer-term impacts on household resilience, but it was very early to confirm the scale of these impacts given that there was yet to be a full agriculture cycle benefitting from the increased water availability. Several stakeholders argued that for short duration projects such as this, the use of simpler food security outcome indicators would have been more appropriate than attempting a RIMA resilience capacity index analysis.
119. The majority of results reported falls in both the food consumption scores and resilience capacity index for both beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries (see Table 6). These findings contradict other qualitative evidence²¹ which found stronger evidence that the various livelihood activities, and to some extent trainings, had contributed to improvements in both agricultural production and the food security of beneficiaries in the Sahel, Somalia, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Palestine and Yemen. For example, in Palestine, focus group discussions with beneficiaries confirmed that

¹⁶ In the case of Cuba, resilience was measured at the cooperative level rather than household level during baseline. No endline was conducted.

¹⁷ It is fair to note that all quantitative impact evaluations, especially those conducted in fragile setting, face significant capacity and implementation constraints.

¹⁸ Two countries (Myanmar and Cuba) did not include a control (non-beneficiary) group in the baseline study due to contextual issues. In Cuba, the study was conducted at cooperatives level as the government restricts data collection at the household level.

¹⁹ For example, with a significant time lag between the baseline data collection and the start of implementation in several countries it was no longer clear that there would be an accurate “before and after” picture.

²⁰ While Shiny RIMA can help with the calculation of the resilience capacity index, a comparison of the resilience capacity indexes between baseline and endline is not straightforward and requires expert advice from headquarters to account for the attrition rates in the panel survey.

²¹ This came from the individual country evaluations and case studies conducted on the different country investments.

the solar power system had stabilized energy supplies, reduced costs of production, reduced death rates of chicks,²² allowed them to expand production and increase employment.

Table 6. Changes in food security and resilience scores

Country	Change in food security	Change in resilience
Burkina Faso	FCS fell for beneficiaries “by 6 points” (no data included of actual FCS values) ¹ FCS fell for non-beneficiaries from 37 to 32 (-11%).	Resilience capacity index fell for beneficiaries from 49 to 42 (-14%) Resilience capacity index fell for non- beneficiaries from 46 to 40 (-13%)
Madagascar	FCS fell for beneficiaries from 36 to 33 (-8%) FCS fell for non-beneficiaries from 35 to 26 (-28%)	Resilience capacity index increased for beneficiaries from 39 to 41 (4%) Resilience capacity index fell for non- beneficiaries from 38 to 37 (-3%)
Myanmar	FCS fell for beneficiaries from 54 to 51 (-6%) FCS fell for non-beneficiaries from 54 to 50 (-8%)	Resilience capacity index fell for beneficiaries from 47 to 42 (-12%) Resilience capacity index fell for non- beneficiaries from 47 to 39 (-16%)
Palestine (No control group)	FCS increased for beneficiaries from 53 to 57 (7%)	Resilience capacity index increased for beneficiaries from 33 to 42 (27%)
Somalia	FCS increased for beneficiaries from 40 to 61 (52%) FCS increased for non-beneficiaries from 37 to 48 (28%)	Resilience capacity index increased for beneficiaries from 52 to 67 (29%) Resilience capacity index increased for non- beneficiaries from 37 to 48 (30%)

Note: ¹ The report does not give the absolute values before and after meaning that a percentage change cannot be calculated.

Source: GNAFC. 2024. *Global Network Against Food Crises*. Rome. <https://www.fightfoodcrises.net/>

120. Given the balance of evidence, it seems plausible that there is an issue with the sensitivity of the methodology to capturing project specific impacts – especially in building resilience. The resilience capacity index values are not benchmarked, making it hard to interpret what any change means – other than an increase or decrease. Furthermore, the RIMA method measures *resilience capacity* (principally in project terms proxied through changes in assets) rather than *realized resilience* in response to actual shocks. The relationship between the two is not straightforward and changes in assets may, or may not, increase resilience to conflict or climate-related shocks, floods or droughts.
121. Stakeholders also pointed out that while the resilience capacity index values assessed changes in levels of resilience capacity, the quantitative data had a limited ability to explain the causality of changes and assessing the contribution of the project to the changes seen. Consequently, the impact assessments include few actionable recommendations, with many outside of the remit of the food-based agencies in the GNAFC Partnership Programme.
122. In contrast, qualitative approaches could provide more relevant insights. For example, a focus group discussion from the South Sudan country investment evaluation suggested that the introduction of new skills and attitudes at household and community level were seen to be potentially more

²² Feedback collected from focus group discussions with poultry farmers revealed that, before having the solar system, they experienced a high rate of chick deaths due to extreme heat during the summer and their inability to spray water inside the farms to cool the environment.

important to longer term changes than input and cash distributions, such as building literacy, numeracy and life skills that underpinned improvements in livelihoods.

Finding 17. The KORE-led learning helped to develop processes and capacities for learning that were valued by Country Offices. However, the Country Offices faced significant challenges in delivering on the learning agenda, including overburdened staff.

123. Work on developing the learning agenda at country level got off to a generally slow start. It was only when KORE engaged with this agenda and provided needed leadership in supporting countries to develop and implement more detailed learning agendas, that the process gained some momentum at field level.
124. The KORE team organized learning review workshops at the country level to help the countries through a reflection process to develop more elaborate learning plans or agendas in several countries. These workshops also developed learning agenda implementation roadmaps that appraised evidence available to answer the learning questions, an action plan to produce missing information and defined learning outputs (such as best practices, learning sheets, learning memo, webinar memo and webinars).

Table 7. Learning review workshops

Country	Learning review workshops and processes
Yemen	Virtual learning review workshop held on 9 March 2021.
Somalia	Continuing consultative process in 2021 and Q1 2022.
Ethiopia	Country Office was autonomous and requested minimal learning support. Learning documents developed independently by FAO Ethiopia.
Sahel	Virtual learning review workshop held on 18 February 2022.
Myanmar	A learning session dedicated to the initial unpacking of the learning questions was organized by KORE in Q2 2021 in collaboration with the Country Office, Conflict and Peace Unit and the Country Support Team.
South Sudan	Virtual learning review workshop held on 4 August 2021.
Palestine	Planned learning review workshop in May 2021 cancelled due to the escalation of conflict in the Gaza Strip. A learning review was undertaken directly by Country Office MEAL personnel, building on guidance/template provided by KORE, but this was not carried out in the form of a workshop or other meetings.
Madagascar	A final event was organized by the Country Office at the end of the project to share key achievements and learning with a range of stakeholders. KORE provided support to emphasize linkage with the learning questions and used outcomes of that workshop to feed into the Madagascar Learning Brief.
Cuba	None held.
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	Regional learning review workshops held in June/July 2021.

Source: FAO KORE. n.d. Knowledge platform on Emergencies and Resilience. In: FAO. Cited 1 March 2024. <https://www.fao.org/in-action/kore/home/en/>

125. Data sources identified to answer the learning questions included supplementary surveys and studies, monitoring data, focus group discussions with beneficiaries and interviews with stakeholders. Workshops, roundtable discussions or virtual team meetings for reflection and assessments within the team or with implementing partners, community or beneficiary representatives, state actors or other stakeholders were also organized to discuss and identify good practices and lessons learned along the stages of the project's cycle.

126. The headquarters support in developing learning agenda to Country Offices was generally viewed as very helpful. The learning approach was new to most teams and this process exposed staff to new concepts and tools. Country Office personnel appreciated how the learning process included the use of M&E data not only to adapt and correct project implementation, but also to answer more strategic learning questions that can help improve programmatic approaches and strategies. Equally, challenges were noted in progressing with implementation. A significant and wide-spread issue was that country staff were already overburdened and focused on project delivery rather than learning. In multiple countries, especially those with less staff capacity, the Country Offices referred to prioritizing the delivery of project activities over learning including Madagascar, Myanmar, Yemen and the Sahel. Other constraints included challenging security contexts that constrained data collection, such as in Yemen.

Finding 18. The learning outputs produced by the GNAFC Partnership Programme principally benefitted the local FAO Country Offices with little evidence of dissemination to, or uptake by, other agencies or countries.

127. The production of learning outputs has been delayed. Learning briefs have been finalized for one of the 12 countries by the end of 2022. There were doubts among other country teams – for example Madagascar and Yemen – on whether learning briefs could be produced given the limited evidence available. While the country learning roadmaps helped to identify the diverse source of evidence to answer the country level learning questions, the evidence collected fell short of providing robust answers to the full range of learning questions. Furthermore, stakeholders in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Yemen and Somalia raised concerns that the learning questions were simply too broad to be answered. Several stakeholders also noted that the focus on using evidence from the country investments alone to answer the learning questions was a constraint, arguing that given the breadth of the learning questions it would have been preferable to draw on evidence from multiple projects, implemented by multiple agencies in-country.

Table 8. Learning products by country

	Publication date	Product type
Yemen	In process	Learning Brief
Somalia	April 2022	Learning Brief
Ethiopia		None
Sahel	In process	Learning Brief
Myanmar	In process	Good practice fact sheet
South Sudan	In process	Learning Brief
Palestine	In process	Learning Brief
Madagascar	In process	Learning Memo
Cuba		None
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	In process	Learning brief or Good practice fact sheet

Source: FAO KORE. n.d. Knowledge platform on Emergencies and Resilience. In: FAO. Cited 1 March 2024. <https://www.fao.org/in-action/kore/home/en/>

128. Other potential analyses referenced in the GNAFC Partnership Programme document were not carried out, but could have potentially been very useful sources of evidence. This included return on investment studies and cost benefit analyses. The GNAFC Partnership Programme document also made reference to “Undertaking special studies on topics to be identified with evidence from country investments”, e.g. support to pastoralism, shock-responsive safety nets, forced and long-

term displacements in protracted crisis contexts. However, the only example of a thematic product came from Ethiopia on disaster risk management (FAO, 2021c).

129. The country investments also built in periodic opportunities to engage with partners to reflect on progress. Several baseline validation exercises were reported – including in South Sudan and Cuba involving governments, civil society and other UN agencies, which fed into adaptation in the project design and implementation arrangements. Monitoring data was also used for adaptive management²³ purposes. This was judged as an important innovation leading to improvements in implementation in Palestine, Myanmar and the Sahel.
130. Several countries referred to drawing on the lessons of the country investments to informing the design of other projects in-country. The projects were seen to help to make arguments to donors and build implementation evidence on best practices. Examples included Yemen, South Sudan, Somalia, Cuba, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Madagascar and Myanmar. To a limited extent, the learnings from the country investments were also leveraged to influence the strategies and programmes of other actors in country. A best practice example was seen in Palestine where the country investment developed an inter-agency road map for the solar electrification of agriculture. Overall, there is little evidence that these learnings from the country investments were leveraged to inform policy and programming more widely.

Finding 19. Developing a typology of crises and response options is a challenging goal and could not be delivered through the evidence generated by the country investments, nor were captured in other initiatives.

131. A key programme goal was to leverage the individual country learnings to develop a food crisis and response typologies to inform investment decisions by global stakeholders in integrated response options along the HDP nexus. More precisely, DG INTPA requested a framework to guide future country investments under the European Union’s Pro Resilience Action. Working in conjunction with the FAO MEAL and RIMA teams, TANGO International was contracted to lead a complementary study exploring whether typologies could be identified, characterized by different contextual factors (e.g. political, geographic, socioeconomic), that contribute to different types of food crises and whether different types of contextual circumstances necessitate different types of responses.
132. An initial study drew on data from the country investments – with reference to both the baselines and information on project activities (TANGO International, 2021b). Regression analysis of the baseline data was conducted to better understand which shocks or shock combinations were driving poor (or better) food security outcomes and define typology groups. This meta-analysis proved problematic as the baselines were found to be insufficiently harmonized and aligned to the key learning questions. “Although commonalities existed, the reports were sufficiently different in what was presented and how, such that any relevant comparisons were neither productive nor valuable. They did not lend themselves to a comparative assessment in any meaningful way” (TANGO International, 2021a).
133. Consequently, TANGO resorted to using international Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) datasets to develop a typology of four food crisis typologies, that covered the GNAFC Partnership Programme countries and seven other crisis countries (see Figure

²³ Adaptive management is defined by USAID as “an intentional approach to making decisions and adjustments in response to new information and changes in context”. Adaptive management is not about changing goals during implementation, rather it is about changing the path being used to achieve the goals in response to changes (USAID, 2021).

5). This classified states into four main food crisis typologies. A major constraint was found to be that comparable data was only available at the national level and this risked oversimplifying the analysis. The study concluded that local-level data and analyses are really needed to guide investments.

Figure 5. Food crisis typology with illustrative examples of food crisis countries



Source: TANGO International. 2021. *GNAFC Food Crises and Response Typologies: Exploratory Analysis*. August 2021. Tucson, United States of America.

134. Several stakeholders also noted that the focus on using evidence from the country investments alone to answer the learning questions was a constraint, arguing that given the breadth of the learning questions it would have been preferable to draw on evidence from multiple projects, implemented by multiple agencies in-country. Several respondents questioned whether constructing a crisis typology was even feasible, arguing that individually crises were too specific in their nature to be usefully aggregated. This appears to be supported by the TANGO analysis which concluded that a typology does not replace the need for full context analysis at the national, subnational or programme area levels. Furthermore, if the typology relies on a classification of drivers, as pointed out by Maxwell (Maxwell *et al.*, 2023) these drivers are usually complex and interrelated.
135. To complement the analysis of crisis typologies, TANGO International also explored the development of a response typology tool. They mapped the country investments across six response option domains for different food crisis typologies. The information was only based on the country investment activities, which in turn were only a sub-set of FAO interventions. A caveat was added that understanding common trends in responses couldn't be sensibly based on the ten GNAFC Partnership Programme country investments. TANGO stated that more work is needed on the response options typology with more information regarding project activities common in FAO's global portfolio – as well as their partners' – and their expected results (TANGO International, 2021b). These investments represented "what was being done rather than what necessarily works".
136. The immediate demand for these typologies has diminished given the decision of the European Union to restructure its budget and the responsibility for the European Union's Pro Resilience Action funding has been increasingly decentralized. However, the idea is still being pursued in

collaboration with FAO's Agrifood Economics and Policy Division.²⁴ The country investment data remains one input to developing this typology, albeit requiring time consuming cleaning to account for the variability in the datasets. However, a much larger data set is needed to support this output.

Finding 20. The GNAFC Partnership Programme provided a significant source of support to strengthening monitoring and learning capacities which benefited the FAO Country Offices beyond the direct use in support of the country investments and GNAFC.


137. The GNAFC Partnership Programme was catalytic in the establishment of the headquarters MEAL team. While originally focused on supporting the GNAFC Partnership Programme, from 2020 this unit has become increasingly engaged in enhancing the capacities more generally, spanning both accountability and learning purposes and supporting decision-making by project managers at more strategic levels. This benefitted both Country Offices with country investments (e.g. the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Yemen reported that the M&E innovations introduced by the GNAFC Partnership Programme were being taken up in other FAO projects in the country) and on a demand responsive basis to other Country Offices with emergency programmes. All countries appreciated and benefitted from the support provided. However, the needs and ability to benefit from the opportunities varied given significant differences in pre-project M&E capacities, differing between large programmes with well-established M&E capacities and Country Offices starting with minimal M&E capacities, which consequently made more significant advances.
138. A range of standard templates, guidelines and processes for MEAL have been produced, including beneficiary registration and counting protocols. FAO also produced a toolkit to provide guidance on how to implement FAO's accountability to affected populations commitments throughout the project cycle.²⁵ The various initiatives of the MEAL team had not yet coalesced into a consolidated guidance manual and approach to M&E. However, the Emergency Preparedness and Response section of the FAO handbook is in the process of being populated with tools and guidance on various aspects of MEAL and FAO's resilience work (FAO, n.d.). Several countries reported that the MEAL team helped with strengthening capacities – including migrating data collection from paper to Kobo Toolbox used for registering beneficiaries and other surveys, with training for enumerators and the provision of equipment.
139. Equally, it was also acknowledged that other FAO projects and programmes have also made important investments in Country Office M&E capacities. For example, FAO South Sudan had already invested in developing its monitoring and evaluation capacity as part of its broader efforts to improve programming and accountability, and the Yemen Country Office had benefitted from other project resources in building its M&E capacities.
140. Likewise, the GNAFC Partnership Programme also catalysed the establishment and scale-up of the KORE knowledge management systems. The KORE online platform promotes a knowledge-sharing culture by disseminating and archiving comprehensive content related to the resilience of agricultural-based livelihoods and food security analyses. Such knowledge can then be used to streamline operations, improve and innovate processes, and ultimately help decision-makers make better informed decisions. This has been supported by webinars and gathering individual good practices into thematic pages. Figure 6(b). show the number of current users against the

²⁴ This work falls outside of the scope of this evaluation.

²⁵ AAP Toolkit 2020 – although this does not appear to have been specifically funded by the GNAFC Partnership Programme.

target set under the GNAFC Partnership Programme and the satisfaction of stakeholders with the KORE activities.

Figure 6. a) KORE number of users; and b) Satisfaction with KORE



Source: GNAFC. 2021c. *Annual Progress Report*. Rome.

141. Given the limited pre-existing skills in learning, KORE has focused on reinforcing the capacities for learning and knowledge management at headquarters and Country Offices, supported by further advocacy for learning. So, while KORE have made progress in documenting, capturing and publishing learnings, there is a need to leverage this knowledge to better inform programming either internally or externally. The role of the GNAFC Partnership Programme in promoting the uptake of KORE knowledge appears quite limited. A knowledge share fair with IGAD was conducted through support from KORE, which was understood to be funded by GNAFC Partnership Programme (IGAD, 2020).

3.3 Contribution to joint and coordinated responses to food crises

EQ 3: What contribution has the GNAFC Partnership Programme made to strengthening policy attention and coordinated responses to food crises?

142. Outcome 3 aimed to increase and strengthen joint and coordinated responses to food crises and promote sustainable solutions to food crises at global, country and regional levels by strengthening the GNAFC as a mechanism to promote global policy attention and coordinated response to food crises. This included support to strengthened coordination at the global, regional and country levels.

Finding 21. The GNAFC Partnership Programme contributed to strengthening the GNAFC as a coordination mechanism through broadening the membership and enhancing the governance of the network. However, the awareness of, and commitment to the GNAFC among the very senior leadership levels of partners remains limited.

143. The GNAFC Partnership Programme was tasked with supporting the development of the GNAFC network. First, through expanding the GNAFC membership to include key stakeholders involved in addressing food crises; second, by helping to define and enhance the governance structure of the GNAFC.
144. The GNAFC was viewed initially by many external stakeholders as a DG INTPA and FAO partnership. This perception was reinforced by the GNAFC Partnership Programme, with funding channelled from the European Union to FAO. While other agencies, including WFP and DG ECHO, were partners in the foundation of the GNAFC, they did not initially engage heavily in the GNAFC activities beyond inputs to the GRFC. This partnership fell short of the GNAFC ambition to create a network of technical organizations, supported by a network of resource partners or donors,

where the analysis is linked to joint responses. Since the creation of the UNJPs, funding is now also provided to WFP, and some indirect funding to UNICEF. This has been critical to encouraging their proactive engagement and is widely seen as essential for building consensus in analysis and strengthening the potential for joint action across the nexus.

145. Equally widening donor participation has been very valuable in building the potential of the GNAFC to go beyond analysis and drive coordinated responses to food crises. The more active engagement of USAID and the World Bank as the other major donors, alongside the European Union, has been particularly valuable and has created a new dynamic for the GNAFC.
146. Challenges remain in building participation in this core group. All members acknowledged that the participation in the GNAFC remained delegated to specific technical units and individuals. The awareness of, and commitment to, the GNAFC among the very senior leadership levels remains limited. There are also important opportunities for greater participation across the organizations. Partly because of limited senior management endorsement, the GNAFC participation often remains siloed within specific technical teams.
147. The governance structure of the GNAFC has also been developed under the GNAFC Partnership Programme and the succeeding UNJPs. The expectations for the preparatory work to be undertaken in developing the GNAFC structures were not explicitly laid out in the GNAFC Partnership Programme logframe and this approach has evolved organically. The work on governance has paralleled the expansion of the membership, with a formalization of the wider partnership, which has facilitated the ability of all members to more equally bring forward their issues and priorities.
148. Governance reforms remain a work in progress and are being discussed and taken forward under the UNJPs. It is recognized that the apex decision-making body, the Strategic Steering Group which is supposed to sit at the deputy head of agency level, has not worked well. Therefore, there is a strong emphasis on establishing this group and facilitating an inaugural meeting in early 2024. This is expected to help build stronger organizational ownership and commitment to the GNAFC, steering the dialogue through defining the priorities, strategies and broader goal.

Finding 22. Interest in joining the GNAFC by an expanded group of agencies is growing and these agencies could potentially bring added value to network activities. However, this is set against a continuing lack of clarity over the network aims and modalities and the potential to complicate management.

149. There has been a notable growth of interest among a range of other agencies in joining the GNAFC, partly driven by outreach from the existing members. This includes other technical agencies (UNICEF, UNDP, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]) and resource partners (International Fund for Agricultural Development [IFAD], the British Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the German Agency for International Cooperation). These partners potentially bring in additional skills and resources, with greater reach across the HDP nexus²⁶ and expertise in sectors beyond food and agriculture which are clearly related to resilience. The decision of whether to pursue further expansion is complicated by the lack of explicit agreement on the criteria for joining, and the rights and responsibilities (including financial contributions) of membership.

²⁶ There are currently no GNAFC members with specific expertise on peace and conflict, despite this being a major driver of food crises.

150. The original governance statement reported that “the Network promotes an open, inclusive membership defined by the scope of its work (actors working around HDP nexus and food systems). As such, it is not expected at this stage to become a formal entity, but rather an alliance platform.” (FAO, 2018). The initial ambition for the GNFAFC was to be an agile structure with open and inclusive membership which could attract diverse constituents from governments, inter-governmental mechanisms, UN agencies, civil society organizations, networks and platforms active in the prevention, preparedness and response to food crises. However, the governance structure has evolved into a formal membership structure, with a need to better distinguish partnerships and membership. Many agencies appeared to want to be “part of the debate” but did not necessarily want to commit to the responsibilities, including financial, that come with membership.
151. Multiple GNFAFC members also highlighted that increasing the membership increases the challenges of reaching consensus. To date, GNFAFC has been far from agile in its decision-making and there are well founded concerns over increasing the complexity of governance. The increase to five core partners has led to practical difficulties in scheduling meetings and meaningful dialogue has proved harder with more parties present. Stakeholders recognize the need to strike a balance between the added-value of adding more members and the more complicated process involved.
152. A fundamental question underlying the development of the GNFAFC membership and governance is what the strategic vision of the network is. There is a general and continuing agreement with the goal of improved alignment in working across the nexus to work on solutions that bring together both short-term humanitarian interventions with longer-term interventions that address the drivers of risk and vulnerability and get at the root causes of protracted food crisis context. However, this potentially encompasses an incredibly broad and complex set of actions. As one stakeholder noted, *“There needs to be more clarity about what the global network wants to achieve and the resources that it needs to do so.”*
153. Other ambiguities were noted. The interest on the peace element of the triple nexus is unclear and was rarely referenced beyond opportunistic linkages to workstreams on displacement. There is no peace actor in the membership at all, nor is there seemingly an intent to invite one which is rather at odds with the HDP nexus framing of the GNFAFC. A further area of debate (that has been further explored under the UNJPs) is the extent to which the GNFAFC should focus on food and agriculture responses or expand to cover multisectoral interventions with obvious implications for the breadth of membership. Other stakeholders questioned whether the GNFAFC should still aspire to promote joint programming or coordinated positioning, or if this was just too ambitious.
154. Consequently, significant differences in opinions among the core GNFAFC bilateral partners were reported on what common priorities the GNFAFC should pursue. Defining a common agenda of action is proving complicated enough among the existing membership, with the GNFAFC appearing to provide a platform for promoting individual agency interests. Interviews indicated that these ranged across the nexus from those focused on emergency response (such as promoting the World Bank country crisis response plans and real-time monitoring and early warning of new crises) to more developmental objectives (such as promoting value chains and food systems) that in some cases risked becoming detached from food crises. There was an agreement that if the GNFAFC is to achieve concrete action, more coherence and consistency is needed among members. Several interviews pointed out that this issue needs be resolved before adding further members. As one member stated, *“form should follow function”*.

Finding 23. The evolution of the GNAFC has been complicated by the need to position itself in a landscape populated by a growing number of global initiatives to address food crises. It is yet to establish its unique role and contribution.²⁷

155. The GNAFC sits alongside several other global initiatives and networks which to varying degrees address food insecurity across the nexus. Many of these were established after the GNAFC. Notable examples include:
- i. The Global Crisis Response Group on Food, Energy and Finance is led by the Deputy-Secretary-General. It has a work stream on food is co-chaired by David Nabarro and Inger Andersen.
 - ii. The UN Famine Prevention and Response Coordinator, Reena Ghelani, under the United Nations Secretary-General.
 - iii. The Global Alliance for Food Security, launched in May 2022 by the G7 and the World Bank Group.
 - iv. The HDP Nexus Coalition is co-led by FAO, G7+, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and WFP and has around 65 members with diverse background and status, including UN organizations, NGOs and civil society.
 - v. The UN Food System Coordination Hub hosted in FAO: The Hub works with the UN Resident Coordinators and UN Country Teams to ensure a coordinated delivery of support services with government partners to develop national pathways.
156. As noted in the 2023 European Union funded review of the GNAFC (ASRAFS, 2023), this proliferation of actions or initiatives has been somewhat uncoordinated and there are large overlaps in terms of membership and functions. Stakeholder commented *"We're beginning to get very fragmented in how we approach Member States to talk about acute food insecurity ... It is nonsensical to the Member States in New York who have no idea what these multiple initiatives are ... it's also quite expensive ... It is the same personalities, we all overlap across multiple different initiatives"*. While the need for coordination across the nexus is undisputed, interviews with external stakeholders viewed this crowded landscape as confusing and unhelpful, with a need for rationalization.
157. Against this backdrop, the GNAFC has sought to position itself in ways that are mutually beneficial, advancing its own agenda while supporting these initiatives. In several cases, the GNAFC provided analytical support to other networks, including acting as the Technical Secretariat to the UN Famine Prevention and Response Coordinator and the HDP Nexus Coalition. However, it is not always clear what value the GNAFC – as opposed to the technical capacities of FAO or WFP – brings to this role. As noted in the 2023 European Union review (ASRAFS, 2023), this support is ad hoc rather than strategic.
158. The most direct potential overlap exists between the GNAFC and the Global Alliance for Food Security. This has a similar mandate as the Global Network, including the provision of data as a global public good – the Global Alliance for Food Security dashboard displayed the IPC data and analysis on the website. The GNAFC partners partially overlap with those of the Global Alliance for Food Security (European Commission, FEWS NET, Cadre Harmonisé, the HDP Nexus Coalition, FAO, FSIN, IPC, USAID, WFP and the World Bank) and some stakeholders suggested that the wider membership of the Global Alliance for Food Security gives it greater credibility as a representative

²⁷ Some of the developments referenced in this finding occurred post-2022 and subsequent to the evaluation time frame. However, they are referenced here in the interests of contextualizing the forward-looking report recommendations.

global network. However, unlike the Global Alliance for Food Security, the GNAFC is not a time-bound initiative.

159. Stakeholders argued strongly for the continued importance of the GNAFC in this setting. Overall, the GNAFC aims to create a synthetic group as a “network of networks”. However, the main supporting arguments appeared questionable. It was argued that the GNAFC is unique in linking action from global to country level. However, it was noted that other initiatives, including the UN Food System Coordination Hub and the HDP Nexus Coalition also span this divide. Nor has the GNAFC Partnership Programme yet confirmed the added value of the GNAFC in country level coordination (see Finding 27). It is also argued that other initiatives are often political processes and have a time-bound mandate often connected to specific events. However, while the GNAFC has no end-date, the current funding commitments only continue until the end of 2024.

Finding 24. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has been effective in supporting the work of the GNAFC in promoting high-level awareness and periodic dialogue around the scale and trends in food crises. However, it has struggled to articulate shared messages and positions or matched stakeholder expectations for convening coordinated analysis and responses to major breaking emergencies.

160. The GNAFC Partnership Programme aimed to promote a more systematic use of the analyses in the global public goods, including the GRFC, for the strategic planning and coordination of sustainable solutions to food crises. This was principally fostered through annual high-level events organized to disseminate the GRFC. The first high level event was attended by approximately 600 people in Brussels in April 2018, while later events were disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic and moved to a virtual format in 2020 and 2021.
161. These events were seen to be highly successful in attracting a very senior level participation from diverse stakeholders.²⁸ They were perceived as important forums for dialogues around the trends in needs and welcomed in helping to build the understanding of participants on the underlying drivers. Simply having the senior leadership involved once a year in a discussion helped to keep the attention on food security. The GNAFC Partnership Programme sponsored events were complemented using other existing high-level initiatives and bodies analyses to disseminate the analysis with the aim of facilitating more coordinated and effective global responses to food crises. Collaboration with platforms, including the Technical Secretariat to the UN Famine Prevention and Response Coordinator and the HDP Nexus Coalition provided another important potential channel for disseminating the GNAFC analysis. The GNAFC also contributed to other high-profile events such as the official side event at the United Nations General Assembly 2020 (presenting a paper on Food Crises and COVID-19: Emerging Evidence and Implications for Action), and a side event at the Committee on World Food Security in 2019 (Stopping and Reversing the Trends in Food Crises) (GNAFC, 2024).
162. While the GNAFC Partnership Programme facilitated the consensual sharing of the analysis of needs, there was less evidence of the GNAFC Partnership Programme facilitating common solutions. Consensus statements on responses tended to remain very high level and generic, such as talking about the importance of building resilience. The limited progress under Component 2 in drawing out evidence on solutions was one limitation to further progress in this area.
163. It proved problematic to develop joint communiques among the principals outlining proposed solutions, as the solutions were often inherently political rather than purely technical. Agreeing on a common position in conflict situations has proven particularly challenging. The absence of

²⁸ Although FAO is represented at Director level in the launch rather than by the Director-General.

very senior level actors in the meetings of the GNAFC advisory groups often prevented meaningful discussion of politically sensitive issues. GNAFC meetings were seen as useful in sharing individual positions and agendas, rather than understanding which ones might be the most effective. Consequently, GNAFC members tended to participate in external events and speak from an agency perspective, rather than with a collective voice.

164. There was a shared perception among several key stakeholders that the GNAFC should have been complementing the annual analyses of the GRFC with a more agile analysis of emerging crises in real time. Although the GNAFC Partnership Programme did support some analyses of the food security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as the Ukraine and Sudan crises by drawing on the capacities of both FAO and WFP, ultimately the members acted in ways that were largely unchanged by the GNAFC analysis. Members argued that the GNAFC should take a more prominent leadership role in the analysis and definition of response options.

Finding 25. The improved global analysis of needs provided through the GNAFC Partnership Programme has not in itself proven sufficient to generate improved overall global funding of food crises as decision-making, which is ultimately political rather than evidence driven.

165. For many stakeholders, the expectation was that bringing together those responsible for the analysis with donors in the GNAFC would lead to improved resourcing – both in terms of the prioritization and the total levels of financing. The key analytical output from the GNAFC Partnership Programme is seen as the consensus numbers of acutely food insecure due to crises, which was expected to support advocacy efforts for better funding.
166. The evaluation did find examples where the GNAFC data was being used to advocate for more resources. Most successfully, DG ECHO used the GRFC data to argue for significant uplifts to their humanitarian budgets over the last two years. Another bilateral donor, although not a GNAFC member, used the GNAFC data to advocate consistently to their parliament for more humanitarian funding. Yet, the gaps in humanitarian funding are still widespread and growing, with significant reductions noted in the budgets of several key donors over the last few years. The decline in funding in 2023 is looking particularly steep and may be as high as 40 percent compared to 2022.²⁹
167. The shortfall in emergency funding is highly relevant for resilience building, as much of its work depends on humanitarian funding. With such steep downturns in funding, it is hard to argue against using the funds available to prioritize meeting life-saving needs over addressing longer-term solutions. The significant financial pressures that both FAO and WFP are facing in their emergency programmes in 2023 were seen to be reducing collaboration and making the interactions more difficult and competitive.
168. Evidence, including from the GNAFC Partnership Programme-sponsored Financing Flows report, indicates that development resources have not been drawn in to support vulnerable populations in food crisis contexts. Development funding remains minimal. Indeed, for key donors including DG INTPA, food security has fallen as a development priority where the current priorities are production-oriented value addition and private sector development. At the same time, DG ECHO finds itself increasingly stretched and with minimal capacity to work beyond life-saving assistance.
169. Some interviewees argued for more investment in partnership and communication to make the evidence more impactful. Other argued that there is a limit to what evidence alone can achieve. So while the GNAFC may have been successful in providing evidence to decision-makers on

²⁹ The data was not finalized for 2023 at the time of the evaluation so no exact figure can be given.

both needs and financing patterns related to food crises, this may not in itself be sufficient to influence decision-making, which is ultimately political rather than evidence-driven.

Finding 26. The GNAFC Partnership Programme piloted approaches to strengthen joint programming and response at country level in collaboration with the Food Security Cluster. While this generated useful tools and pilot approaches, the Food Security Cluster mandate remains focused on humanitarian action.

170. Under Component 3, the GNAFC Partnership Programme also aimed to mirror efforts at global level, working with national and regional platforms/coordination mechanisms to strengthen joint programming and response at country and regional levels. At country level, the plan was to reinforce the coordination role of the Food Security Clusters, that are co-led by FAO and WFP, to strengthen their relationship with other humanitarian and development coordination platforms. Particular attention was paid to encouraging the Global Food Security Cluster to gradually evolve from a purely humanitarian focus towards support to the HDP nexus, and provide support to country coordination of food security clusters in developing resilience-oriented programming and monitoring.
171. The start of the work with the Global Food Security Cluster was slow, with reported delays in agreeing on roles and responsibilities, as well as the work plan. Ultimately, several outputs were produced with GNAFC Partnership Programme support. Building on the existing knowledge of humanitarian activities, the Food Security Cluster in five pilot countries mapped complementary peace and development activities. This HDP nexus mapping exercise was intended to help identify and bridge gaps between these actors by creating better mutual awareness of ongoing activities to link the programme and avoid duplication, as well as maximize impact. This pilot developed the methodology and tools needed to map across HDP nexus. Clear challenges in implementation included: irregular reporting and data from development actors, a lack of data from government and the number of potential activities to be mapped.
172. One example of how the mapping exercises were used was to estimate the budget needed for a graduation strategy in Nigeria, with a progressive shift from humanitarian, to peace and development activities. However, this approach was not implemented. The Global Food Security Cluster and several countries were reportedly interested in integrating the use of this mapping tool, but unfortunately lacked human and financial resources to mainstream it.
173. Other products developed by the Global Food Security Cluster included publishing a handbook of HDP nexus activities and drafting a cluster strategy on HDP nexus. With support from the GNAFC Partnership Programme, the cluster has worked to ensure that agreed protocols support HDP nexus-based approaches, around areas such as joint needs analysis, integrated response planning and collective accountability in contexts affected by extended food crisis and fragility. Two scientific papers in peer review journals were published on the HPD nexus in Somalia and Chad to examine the interlinkages between food insecurity and climate conflict. The use of these products was not tracked by the evaluation.
174. Interviewees perceived that the Global Food Security Cluster-led work on coordination was never adequately linked to, and integrated with the rest of the GNAFC Partnership Programme strategy and programming, and this limited the ability to link it to a bigger objective. Other stakeholders argued that while the Food Security Cluster was one key partner in improved coordination at country level, its humanitarian mandate meant that it was not the right locus for leading coordination across the HPD nexus. Development actors do not generally participate in cluster meetings, nor is there an interest in the cluster to significantly expand its mandate.

Finding 27. Overall, the GNAFC Partnership Programme had little impact on supporting country level coordinated programming and the potential of the GNAFC partners was not capitalized. Consensus is still lacking on how the GNAFC can most usefully support efforts at country level.

175. There was a general consensus that a key test for the GNAFC is whether it can ultimately have an impact at the country level. To date, the limited impact of the GNAFC Partnership Programme on country coordination was highlighted through mini-case studies in Yemen and South Sudan. These studies examined what significant developments there had been in the collective approaches building resilience to food crises and then attempted to assess what (if any) contribution had been made by the GNAFC Partnership Programme (see Box 4). The visibility of the GNAFC Partnership Programme at country level, and interest of stakeholders in engaging with it, remains low.

Box 4. Resilience partnerships in South Sudan

Since the famine in early 2017, resilience started to move up the agenda of development partners and the UN community in a more structured manner. The dialogue on resilience had the objective of reducing aid dependency through greater investment in resilience. Out of these discussions, a shared commitment to “reduce vulnerability and build resilience” emerged. This resulted in the formation of a number of initiatives.

FAO in South Sudan reported that it contributes to approximately 20 coordination fora within South Sudan. These range from government forums to organizational-led fora. A number of resilience coordination mechanisms are active in South Sudan to various degrees, including Partnership for Recovery and Resilience (PfRR), Reconciliation, Stabilization, and Resilience Trust Fund (RSRTF), OCHA Flagship Initiative and the World Banks Food Security Crisis Preparedness plan for South Sudan.

Opinions on the potential contribution of the GNAFC to country coordination varied. However, given the plethora of coordination fora and initiatives there was little interest in adding to these. Some stakeholders suggested that the GNAFC could play an important role as a convener for knowledge sharing across countries and regions, for example on other countries’ experiences on solutions or approaches to climate change and resilience, and at a global level to better understand what drivers of food security are, while others suggested a greater investment on regional analysis is needed.

Source: Authors’ own elaboration.

176. Under the GNAFC Partnership Programme there were very preliminary discussions on the operationalization of the Global Network at country level. Selected countries undertook a preliminary mapping exercise to identify mechanisms, initiatives and stakeholders according to the three dimensions of the Global Network. This process was reportedly used to identify entry points and draft a potential roadmap for the establishment of the Network at country level, according to the specificities of each country. According to the GNAFC Partnership Programme, preliminary mapping exercises have been conducted in South Sudan, Madagascar, Palestine and Yemen (GNAFC, 2021c). However, there was no clear reporting of the results and outcomes.
177. The country investments did not lead to the establishment of the GNAFC coordination platforms at country level. While partnership is a key element of resilience building approaches and the overarching objectives of the GNAFC, it was not reflected as a specific objective of the country investments under Component 2. Partnerships were mostly limited to implementation agreements, generally with government but very few examples of formal partnerships with other UN or international agencies. The relatively small-scale of the country projects did not provide a strong platform to foster inter-agency partnerships.
178. In part, this was also a reflection of the slow progress in generating learning, with little that was relevant for policy discussion. As one key informant interview said, “*we still don’t have messages about country level work that we can share strongly and in a competitive manner*”. A notable exception to this is Palestine, where a dedicated inter-agency working group on solar energy was established to agree and follow up on future coordination set up on solar energy interventions at

both strategic and technical levels. This provided an important strategic forum with wide representation across UN agencies and organizations, international and local NGOs, government institutions and the private sector.

179. Evaluation interviews identified several potential entry points for the GNAFC in supporting improved country coordination. Most of these revolved around supporting better analysis linked to strengthened coordination structures. However, stakeholders argued that the extent of analytical gaps was often context specific, as was the need for better coordination. Certainly, the two evaluation case studies suggested that coordination platforms were already in place in those contexts. Clearly, context is important and the need for a demand and country-driven approach, according to needs and specific requirements and engagement of national stakeholders, has been acknowledged (GNAFC, n.d.). The GNAFC would need to build upon and strengthen existing country mechanisms and initiatives to avoid duplication of effort.
180. A key lesson from the GNAFC Partnership Programme was that the potential strengths of the GNAFC alliance were not brought to the country level in building country coordination. Nor is this straightforward as the linkage between headquarters personnel and programme personnel in-country may not be that strong. In the case of DG INTPA, this was not helped by a change in the reporting lines, with the European Union Delegations now reporting to the European External Action Service (EEAS) rather than DG INTPA on development programmes. Even within FAO and WFP, it was acknowledged that the linkages were not always that strong. Mobilizing funding from GNAFC partners at country level in support of operationalizing coordinated plans is a further challenge that will need to be addressed.
181. Work is ongoing under the UNJPs in developing a country engagement strategy based on an analysis of the effectiveness of coordination around food security, analytical capacity, policy gaps and planning frameworks. Underlying this is the perceived value in an external and multi-agency partnership mechanism (i.e. the GNAFC) coming in and being able to do a diagnosis around what the challenges are to the system in the country, and having the resources to contribute to fixing them. A partnership approach is seen to be much more influential and necessary to stimulating change than any process owned by a single agency.

Finding 28. Support to regional institutions coordinating food crises analysis and response has been welcomed but remained a bilateral partnership with FAO and failed to engage the other GNAFC partners in joint solutions.

182. To further complement the work in supporting coordination at the global and country levels, the GNAFC Partnership Programme also supported coordination efforts at regional level, principally in East Africa and the Horn of Africa through IGAD, and in West Africa through CILSS. This included financial support to food security analyses conducted by these institutions in line with the GNAFC Partnership Programme Component 1. In West Africa, the IPC supported the Cadre Harmonisé under CIILS, while the GNAFC Partnership Programme provided resources to establish the IGAD Food Security Nutrition and Resilience Analysis Hub, which integrates the Food Security and Nutrition Working Group and the Resilience Analysis Unit.
183. This analytical strand of work continued the capacity building support previously provided by FAO to these regional institutions. Stakeholders perceived that the GNAFC Partnership Programme had consolidated and elevated the analytical work done by these regional bodies. Furthermore, the support revitalized the regional Food Security and Nutrition Working Group, which has a central role as a key source of information for the region – using IPC and other sources to provide a monthly regional overview with some forecasting of information. The Working Group is seen as very influential in regional decision-making.

184. The GNAFC Partnership Programme also hosted several workshops and events in both regions to engage senior government representatives with the analytical work and promote actions to address root causes of food crises. This has included working with IGAD and CILSS to convene regional ministers and humanitarian partners to secure political agreements around food system strengthening and food crisis prevention. The GNAFC Partnership Programme inputs were credited with shaping the ministerial declaration that IGAD issued on famine prevention in 2022. However, it was not possible to gauge to what extent this was translated into tangible actions.
185. Other events included one regional workshop examining the importance of going beyond food, with investments in sectors beyond food and agriculture. These workshops were viewed as well-organized and interesting opportunities for the exchange of ideas and experiences, although somewhat top-down and disconnected from longer-term processes.
186. The support provided to the regional level was generally welcomed, and it was recognized that it is often overlooked. This was seen as making sense in that many shocks were regional – or at least cross-border – in nature. Consequently, it is logical to consider regional responses. However, as with the interventions at country level, it is not clear that the potential of the GNAFC alliance was leveraged, with an effective bilateral relationship between FAO and the regional bodies. The regional bodies reported that their interactions with the other GNAFC members remained entirely bilateral.
187. Based on the analysis of food security information, several joint programmatic interventions were proposed in the region. However, despite being under the GNAFC umbrella, only the desert locust project attracted funding. Other proposals, such as strategic investments to reduce post-harvest losses and production of livestock fodder flowing from the food summit, did not attract support from the GNAFC partners. It is unclear to regional stakeholders whether or not the GNAFC is set up to help link consensus-based solutions to funding opportunities.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

4.1 Conclusions

Conclusion 1. The implicit TOC underlying the GNAFC Partnership Programme appears valid but incomplete. Shortfalls in the delivery of the GNAFC Partnership Programme did not allow a full testing of the assumed TOC, but it is apparent that there are large assumptions that were neither properly identified nor mitigated.

188. The GNAFC Partnership Programme was built to support the establishment and operation of the GNAFC, to build partnerships to address root causes of crises in a coordinated and evidence-based manner. The evaluation evidence confirmed that this remained a relevant objective. With limited resources available in the aid system, there is a clear need to better target resources across the HDP nexus. This involves focusing on those most in need and using the limited resources in the most effective ways by simultaneously addressing both immediate humanitarian needs and the root causes.
189. Furthermore, it is apparent that this needs to be done in a more coordinated manner to maximize the impact of interventions, concentrating investments on the most pressing needs and effective responses, and maximizing synergies. Furthermore, better evidence of effective interventions not only supports better targeting and use of existing resources, but is important in supporting advocacy to increase the overall availability of resources necessary to reduce current and future food crises.
190. But while the design of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, spanning investments in improved analysis of needs, evidence of solutions and better coordination, remained relevant there are indications that this was necessary, but insufficient, to improve policies and programming. As the GNAFC Partnership Programme only delivered partially against its design intentions, with deficits under Components 2 and 3, it is not possible to definitely confirm the adequacy of the design. However, not only was this a highly ambitious goal, but the evidence suggests that achieving the overall goal was highly dependent on additional factors outside of the programme's scope.
191. The challenges in working across the HDP nexus are significant and structural in nature, with deeply embedded incentives for maintaining the status quo. Decision-making is ultimately highly political and technical analysis is only one input to this. An improved understanding of the context for the GNAFC Partnership Programme approach, the causal pathways and the underlying assumptions could have helped to better refine the GNAFC Partnership Programme – or future approaches – to improve the effectiveness of the approach.

Conclusion 2. Building on earlier investments, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has contributed to further improvements in assessment and analysis and has built an important global consensus among partners on the scale of needs.

192. The GNAFC Partnership Programme, in concert with contributions from other donors, has continued to provide an important source of central funding to support the rollout and technical development of the IPC. While there are clearly continuing challenges and further opportunities to technically strengthen this tool, it provides a robust and critical source of information on levels of acute food insecurity. This tool was already well established prior to the start of the GNAFC Partnership Programme and is heavily relied on by donors as a primary source of information for allocating humanitarian resources.

193. In addition to channelling resources to the IPC, it is important to acknowledge that the GNAFC Partnership Programme has added value by providing an important platform to build political commitment around the use of the IPC as a global reference. This is evidenced by brokering an agreement between FAO and WFP to primarily use the IPC data when and where available, as well as amplifying the country level data through the GRFC. This report has become an important source of advocacy and influential input to global policy discussions.
194. While important progress has been made in promoting this data as an agreed reference point, its use is not yet consistent and remains somewhat fragile. The global public goods associated with these analyses are strongly appreciated and welcomed, but there are important opportunities to improve the content and communication. Improved communication around these global public goods could further improve their influence on decision-makers.

Conclusion 3. There is an unmet opportunity to use the GNAFC platform to build consensus on forward projections on needs. While the retrospective global overview of needs provided by the GRFC is important for advocacy and policy development, there is a clear demand for consensus figures on forwarding looking projections as a basis for coordinated decision-making by humanitarian actors.

195. The GNAFC Partnership Programme, again building on the earlier work of INFORMED, has been influential in building the capacity for anticipatory action within FAO. This contribution was instrumental in establishing this capacity within FAO. The role of FAO in this space is now highly regarded by external stakeholders and the Organization has become a key anticipatory action player. The anticipatory action function has been largely mainstreamed within the FAO Office of Emergencies and Resilience and is no longer reliant on the GNAFC related successor UNJPs for either funding or as a primary network for dissemination or coordination.
196. The GNAFC Partnership Programme played an important role here, not just as a funder for anticipatory action capacities, but as platform for building consensus. Under the encouragement of the GNAFC Partnership Programme, the parallel early warning global analyses of FAO and WFP have been brought together into a consolidated report. However, a single consensus source of estimated needs is yet to be presented. Instead, users typically remain reliant on single agency estimates which are at times contradictory. Users also questioned the credibility and independence of these estimates given they are produced by the appealing agencies themselves.
197. There is a clear appetite among donors for a consensus on forward looking needs that could be used to better target the limited humanitarian resources, although to some extent this is being addressed through the Global Alliance for Food Security. However, there is also a desire to align this analysis of needs with a better analysis of responses that embed thinking around the triple nexus from the outset of the response. The expectations of stakeholders are that the GNAFC Partnership Programme should be more responsive in producing ad hoc analysis and communication around major emerging global emergencies.

Conclusion 4. The GNAFC Partnership Programme failed to deliver significant evidence on “what works” in terms of building resilience and addressing the root causes of food crises. Progress was hampered by the inadequate design and implementation of the country investments. Further innovation is required to build organizational commitment at all levels and learning capacities.

198. The GNAFC Partnership Programme Component 2 sought to capture evidence of the results of the country investments that could be used to drive advocacy and improve decision-making at country, regional and global levels. The ability to leverage learnings from these project interventions to inform better decision-making and investment choices at multiple levels did not develop to the extent anticipated.

199. Multiple design factors contributed to this outcome. Learning required significant shifts in organizational culture with FAO processes at Country Office level found to be more oriented towards compliance and delivery rather than encouraging innovation and flexibility. For most FAO Country Offices, the focus of the country investments remained on project delivery to beneficiary households, rather than learning. In some cases, the learning agenda struggle to capture the attention of managers who were not convinced of the purpose or value of what was being done or how it differed from existing approaches to M&E and the communication of best practices. Some managers remained uncertain of who the learning was intended to serve and where the responsibility and accountability for delivering on learning lay.
200. The country investments were not principally conceived as learning opportunities and the learning agenda was only developed after the projects themselves, and the learning goal was – to some extent – bolted on as an after-thought. Learning opportunities could have been enhanced if this objective was more firmly embedded in the initial design. Sources of evidence needed to answer the learning questions were not built into the workplans and inevitably the programme struggled to answer the learning questions retroactively. Projects were relatively small-scale and short-duration and were not well aligned to capturing the effects on resilience over the longer-term.
201. Improving the evidence on the effectiveness of different actions in working across the triple nexus remains, potentially, an important area of comparative advantage for FAO. The experience of the GNAFC Partnership Programme has been helpful in progressing elements of the approach and emphasizing good practice, while also highlighting the need for further innovation in the learning approach. A sustained learning process is most likely to be effective when embedded at the country level. This requires creating an enabling institutional environment with the resources, time and incentives for learning. Learning requires a change in organizational culture and attitudes with the time and space for Country Offices to pause and reflect on progress.

Conclusion 5. A further significant limitation to developing the evidence base on effective responses were the methodological challenges in measuring changes in resilience capacity, unpacking the pathways to change and linking this analysis to decision-makers.

202. The GNAFC Partnership Programme did help to improve the analytical capacity of FAO at country level with improved tools and capacities for monitoring and evaluation. To varying degrees the GNAFC Partnership Programme has strengthening monitoring and evaluation processes, and this gained traction within the Country Offices, with significant benefits beyond the country investment projects. The GNAFC Partnership Programme has played an important role in encouraging a systematic way of measuring the impact of projects, and in carrying out robust impact assessments. This effectively raised attention in Country Offices about the value of impact evaluation – few FAO projects have previously examined this through the use of treatment and control groups. The approaches introduced have been helpful in encouraging increased rigour in the collection of the evidence of results.
203. However, the more specific attempt to develop methods and approaches to understand and measure resilience through the RIMA tool remained challenging. The RIMA tool has proved challenging for country teams to conduct and analyse even with a degree of continuing headquarters support. The data heavy survey-based approach was expensive and time consuming. This has affected the timeliness, quality and usability of the results. Resilience measurement in this format requires significant funding and it is not feasible to attempt to include this as a standard tool across FAO projects. Further thought is needed on when and where the use of this approach is justified. To make the best use of resources, impact assessments could be conducted periodically at the programmatic, rather than project level.

204. The RIMA tool did help staff with a framework to understand the concept of resilience, as distinct from food security. However, the core resilience capacity index value within RIMA does not alone provide detailed insights into the causal pathways that lead to strengthened resilience. Therefore, complementary approaches still need to be used alongside RIMA as part of a more diverse toolbox and the use of other more user friendly, less costly but equally rigorous qualitative approaches should be further investigated.
205. There are questions over the feasibility of the core GNAFC Partnership Programme goal of developing a typology of crises and responses. Progress in drawing together the evidence to underpin such a typology has been slow, with capacity constraints and methodological challenges. The complexity of potential contexts and potential responses makes a user-friendly typology hard to construct or communicate. There are strong arguments that the choice of response options is so highly context-specific that the ability to develop a useable typology of crises and responses is doubtful. There was little evidence that the country investments provided the best, or sufficient, examples on which to develop such a comprehensive typology. A more pragmatic immediate goal may be a simpler toolbox of solutions with guidelines for quality programming.
206. Critically, there was a missed opportunity to capture learning across the wider FAO portfolio rather than focusing on a small number of country investments. It would have been preferable to delink the learning agenda from the direct funding of individual projects and consider funding learning related activities across the FAO portfolio. This would also have allowed for learning from a wider and more strategic selection of projects. Conducting learning across the programme increases the range of evidence that could be drawn on, allowing more appropriate and flexible time frames for learning and maximizing the influence across the FAO portfolio.
207. FAO research capacities across different divisions could have been further leveraged and coordinated more effectively to contribute understanding on building resilience to food crises. Partnerships on learning should be more deeply explored, both with other implementing agencies to collectively learn on what works and strategic partnerships with research institutions on how to learn.

Conclusion 6. Limited progress was made by the GNAFC Partnership Programme in driving forward coordinated decision-making on crisis response across the HDP nexus at global or country levels. While GNAFC membership has broadened, it has not deepened to involve the very senior management needed to broker better alignment or leveraged connections between the global and country level coordination efforts.

208. At global level there was significant progress under the GNAFC Partnership Programme in strengthening the GNAFC, broadening this from what was perceived to be essentially an FAO-European Union partnership. The GNAFC Partnership Programme helped to bring together a potentially powerful set of global partners – including WFP, the United States of America and the World Bank – to work on food crises. At the same time, the potential of this alliance was not fully realized under the GNAFC Partnership Programme. In particular, the platform was not leveraged to develop consensus positions and coordinated decision-making. Consequently, coordination at global level largely remained at the level of exchange of information rather than alignment of positions or harmonized programming.
209. While this can be partly attributed to the limited evidence delivered through Component 2, there were also evident challenges with the form and function of the GNAFC itself. While the number of members has broadened, participation remains with specific technical focal points within these organizations, rather than a broader cross-organizational buy-in commitment. Furthermore,

improved organizational alignment is ultimately dependent on the active commitment of senior leadership in the respective member organizations to the GNAFC to provide the necessary political leadership. The understanding and participation of the most senior leadership in the GNAFC remains limited.

210. While the GNAFC Partnership Programme was largely focused on efforts to enhance coordination at global level, it is apparent that the ultimate test of effectiveness is the extent to which it contributed to improved aligned and programming at the country level. However, the GNAFC Partnership Programme failed in defining the comparative advantage of the GNAFC in supporting coordination at the country level. The focus and investment of the GNAFC Partnership Programme in country level coordination was modest, with limited progress in developing a model of how the GNAFC might meaningfully support replicable country level coordination initiatives.
211. There was a striking disconnect between the global level coordination efforts and the country (and regional efforts). Country (and regional) level coordination failed to build on the global GNAFC partnerships and there was little evidence that it was attempting to align the work of the European Union, USAID and the World Bank as a starting point.

Conclusion 7. Building alignment across the triple nexus has proved particularly challenging given the political sensitivities involved. Consequently, the role of the GNAFC in addressing the root causes of conflict-related food insecurity needs to be understood as a contributor to other political processes.

212. An important early insight from the analysis of drivers of food insecurity was that the majority of crises are protracted and complex, with large-scale conflict playing a major role. Logically reducing food insecurity requires more attention to conflict mitigation and peace as a solution to food insecurity. However, the GNAFC has struggled to build collective positions on response to conflict-driven food crises.
213. The conflict (context) analysis supported by the GNAFC Partnership Programme has generally proved relevant to improved programming, although much of the analysis was conducted too late to feed into the initial design of the country investments. This analysis is aligned with the point that FAO has the capacity and mandate for reducing natural resource-based tensions at the community level, incorporating “doing no-harm” as a basic approach. This work is rightly being mainstreamed within FAO as an operational tool, by adapting the guidance and approach to this analysis to match differing contexts and Country Office capacities.
214. However, FAO is not in itself a peace actor and has an indirect role in larger-scale conflicts and displacement. Understanding these risks and working towards solutions requires different analytical skills which are not currently included within the GNAFC membership. Furthermore, addressing conflict is clearly ultimately a political, rather than technical challenge. The challenge is to find opportunities to maximize the contribution of the GNAFC with other political forums. However, this is complicated by the fact that many of the key GNAFC members are themselves perceived as political actors in these conflicts, which creates challenges for ensuring the independence, or perceived independence, of the analysis.

4.2 Recommendations

215. The following recommendations are based on the preceding evidence and analysis. Building on this evidence, the recommendations are intended to inform and support the continuing engagement of FAO with the GNAFC. Given the scope of the evaluation, these recommendations are directed specifically at FAO, rather than the GNAFC as a whole. However, the

recommendations should be of interest and potential relevance to the wider membership of the GNAFC.

Recommendation 1. FAO should work with partners to sharpen the strategic vision of the GNAFC and the associated activities.

This recommendation responds to Conclusions 1, 3 and 6.

This strategic recommendation should include considerations of the following suggested actions or interventions to implement the recommendation.

Recommendation 1.1. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* FAO should advocate to re-focus the GNAFC partners, building a theory of change (TOC) to identify causal pathways of change and underlying assumptions. This should take into account the roles of other networks and initiatives and should inform priority areas of work for the GNAFC.

Priority: High

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 1.2. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* FAO should work with partners to ensure that the GNAFC workplan represents a consensus, based on a strategic analysis of the most important priority actions that contribute to addressing the underlying causes of food crises, rather than individual agency priorities.

Priority: High

Timeline: By 2025

Recommendation 1.3. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives, Global Food Security Cluster:* FAO should work with GNAFC partners to prioritize activities that improve programmatic coordination among the GNAFC partner agencies at global level, as a basis for, and precursor of, stronger coordination at country level.

Priority: High

Timeline: End 2026

Recommendation 1.4. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit with the Office of Emergencies and Resilience (Anticipatory Action) and Rural Transformation and Gender Equality Division (Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture [GIEWS]):* FAO should work with GNAFC partners to strengthen the analysis of the causes and impacts of major emerging food crises and capitalize on the GNAFC as a platform to plan and advocate for coordinated responses that address the nexus from the outset.

Priority: High

Timeline: End 2026

Recommendation 2. FAO should advocate for the governance, membership and participation in the GNAFC to be adopted in line with delivering the refined objectives and activities of the network.

This recommendation responds to Conclusions 6 and 7.

This strategic recommendation should include considerations of the following suggested actions or interventions to implement the recommendation.

Recommendation 2.1. *To the FAO Senior Advisory Group representatives:* Promote the engagement of the FAO senior leadership in the GNAFC, encouraging and supporting their active participation in the senior governance structures and participating in key events, including the launch of the annual Global Report on Food Crises.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 2.2. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* Advocate to other GNAFC members to encourage the active participation of their respective senior leadership in the GNAFC Senior Strategic Group and key events.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 2.3. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* Consider advocating for the inclusion of agencies with a peacebuilding mandate and experience within the GNAFC.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 2.4. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit representatives, Office of Emergencies and Resilience Units, Agrifood Economics and Policy Division, Rural Transformation and Gender Equality Division:* Encourage and facilitate cross-organizational participation of FAO divisions and units in the GNAFC activities through enhanced collaboration in the development of the respective workplans.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 3. FAO should continue to invest in, and develop, analytical tools that contribute to the objectives of the GNAFC.

This recommendation responds to Conclusions 2 and 3.

This strategic recommendation should include considerations of the following suggested actions or interventions to implement the recommendation.

Recommendation 3.1. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* Use the GNAFC platform to advocate for continued expansion of the IPC coverage as a preferred standard – including funding to expand the coverage of acute food insecurity scales and advocating with host governments on the importance of participating in IPC consensus building processes.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: Mid 2026

Recommendation 3.2. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* Consider with partners whether the GNAFC should build consensus, reporting and publication of forward-looking estimates of food insecurity, as a complement to the retrospective data provided through the GRFC

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 4. FAO should work with partners to increase the use of, and relevance to, decision-makers of the global public goods produced with the support of the GNAFC.

This recommendation responds to Conclusions 2, 6 and 7.

This strategic recommendation should include considerations of the following suggested actions or interventions to implement the recommendation.

Recommendation 4.1. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit representatives:* FAO should work with GNAFC partners to improve the communication of the Global Report on Food Crises and the Financing Flows Analysis in formats tailored for different audiences.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 4.2. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit representatives, IPC Global Support Unit, SOFI report team:* FAO should work with GNAFC partners and FAO units responsible for other food security data and reports to provide a consistent explanation and presentation of how different food insecurity figures interrelate, including: past, current, forward-looking figures; chronic and acute food insecurity; and data covering differing geographical regions.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 4.3. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* FAO should work with GNAFC partners to ensure that the Global Report on Food Crises and the Financing Flows Analysis are accompanied by consensus-based key messages on the implications and necessary actions including both the type and amount of resources necessary to make an impact at scale in reducing vulnerability to food crises.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 4.4. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* FAO should consult with GNAFC partners to consider whether the GRFC mid-year update should continue to be produced.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 4.5. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Senior Advisory Group representatives:* FAO should clarify that the United Nations Security Council brief is a UN authored product without a direct connection to the GNAFC.

Priority: High

Timeline: Mid 2025

Recommendation 5. FAO should continue to invest in, and develop, approaches to gathering and disseminating evidence on the effectiveness of different interventions on addressing the root causes of crises.

This recommendation responds to Conclusion 4 and 5.

This strategic recommendation should include considerations of the following suggested actions or interventions to implement the recommendation.

Recommendation 5.1. *To the Office of Emergencies and Resilience:* Building on the support provided under the GNAFC Partnership Programme, FAO should continue to support the mainstreaming and further development of the conflict analysis, MEAL and KORE functions as under the Office of Emergencies and Resilience. Institutionalizing the pilot practice of ring-fencing minimum project funds for monitoring, evaluation and learning purposes should be considered.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 5.2. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Office of Emergencies and Resilience MEAL and RIMA teams:* Reflect on the experience of the GNAFC Partnership Programme to develop a more appropriate and effective methodological approach to evaluating the impact of resilience building activities, and should retain a clear focus on household resilience while taking into consideration a systems approach.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 5.3. *To the FAO KORE, MEAL and RIMA teams, selected FAO Country Offices:* Explore the possibilities of working in partnership with specialized actors (academia, think tanks) to implement the learning agendas at corporate and country level.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 5.4. *To the FAO Technical Support Unit and Office of Emergencies and Resilience MEAL and KORE teams:* Capitalize on the GNAFC to bring in decision-maker perspectives to setting FAO research agendas and using the GNAFC to disseminate and amplify FAO learnings among external users.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 6. A refined and more efficient evaluation approach should be adopted for the UNJPs

This recommendation responds to the evaluation limitations.

Recommendation 6.1. *To the Office of Emergencies and Resilience and Office of Evaluation:* The scope of overarching evaluations or reviews of the UNJPs – and potentially other programmatic investments supporting the GNAFC – should be set at the level of the GNAFC rather than the individual programmes. These evaluations should also be conducted jointly with WFP.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

Recommendation 6.2. *To the Office of Emergencies and Resilience and Office of Evaluation:* Other standalone evaluations should be considered to support the strategic and technical direction of key areas, starting with approaches to resilience analysis.

Priority: Medium

Timeline: By 2026

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Appendix 1. People interviewed

Last name	First name	Institution/agency	Role
Abdi	Fitar	IGAD IFRAH	Head of IGAD IFRAH
Abdi	Jamah	IGAD IFRAH	Former Head of IGAD IFRAH
Antonacci	Lavinia	FAO	Programme Officer, OER
Asfaw Manni	Alemu	FAO Yemen	Chief Technical Adviser
Berlofa	Andrea	FAO Yemen	Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer
Berton	Helene	DG INTPA	Policy Officer
Bruno	Marta	FAO	Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer
Burgeon	Dominique	FAO Geneva	Director, FAOLOG
Chicet	Carina	Development Initiatives	Senior Analyst
Comforti	Piero	FAO	Deputy Director, ESS
Constas	Mark	Cornell University	Professor of Applied Economics and Policy
Davis	Ben	FAO	Director, ESP
Dzurumi	Felix	FAO South Sudan	Senior Programme Officer
Elliot	Conor	FAO New York	Senior Liaison Officer, FAOLON
Ferrand	Cyril	FAO Kenya – Resilience Hub	Senior Agricultural Officer
Ferreira	Pedro	FAO	Programme Officer -TB
Fotious	Stefan	FAO	Director, OSG
Gebbru	Abeshaw	FAO Ghana – Regional Office	Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, FAORAF
Gentzel	Louise	WFP	Dimension 3 Lead (Partnership)
Ghelani	Reena	United Nations	UN Famine and Response Coordinator
Gil Quintana	Rodrigo	DG ECHO	Policy Officer
Holleman	Cindy	FAO	Senior Economist, ESA
Hove	Lewis	FAO South Africa (FAOSFS)	Sub-Regional Resilience Officer, FAOSFS
Innocente	Sergio	FAO Kenya – Resilience Hub	Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, FAOKE
Jackson	Julius	FAO	Technical Officer, OER
Jacqueson	Patrick	FAO	Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, OER
Johnson	Mark	FAO	Social Protection and Cash Transfer Specialist, ESP
Kaatrud	David	WFP	Director of Programme
Kerandi	Nicholas	FAO South Sudan	Technical Adviser, FAOSS
Knox	Duncan	Development Initiatives	Senior Analyst

Appendix 1. People interviewed

Last name	First name	Institution/agency	Role
Larraca	Giacomo	FAO	Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, OER
Lazarus	Brenda	FAO Kenya – Resilience Hub	Economist
Lombardi	Niccolo	FAO	Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, OER
Lopez	Jose	IPC	Senior Programme Coordinator, ESA
Macleman	Hugh	WFP	Dimension 2 Lead (Country Engagement)
Majid	Abdual	Food Security Cluster	Global Coordinator
Marsland	Neil	FAO	Senior Technical Officer, OER
Matras	Frederique	FAO	Information and Knowledge Management Officer, OER
Maxwell	Dan	Tufts University	Research Director at Feinstein International Center
McHattie	Sarah	Food Security Information Network	Global Coordinator
Meyer	John	USAID	Senior Strategy and Impact Advisor
Mizzi	Leonard	DG-INTPA	Head of Unit -International Partnerships - Sustainable Agri-Food systems and Fisheries
Muci	Giampiero	FAO	GNAFC Senior Adviser, OER
Nabarro	David	Strategic Director	4SD Foundation
O'Brien	Erin	FAO	Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, OER
Osman	Abdal Mounim	FAO	Senior Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, OER
Paulsen	Rein	FAO	Director, OER
Pietrelli	Rebecca	FAO	Economist, ESA-OER
Piras	PierPaolo	FAO	Programme Officer, OER
Priestley	Phil	FAO	Emergency and Rehabilitation Officer, OER
Richards	Rebecca	WFP	Programme Manager
Ruiz Espi	Jose	DG ECHO	Policy Officer
Russo	Luca	FAO	Senior Strategic Advisor on Resilience, OER
Salameh	Lina	Development Initiatives	Senior Programme Development Specialist
Santini	Rachele	FAO	Communications Officer, OER
Schuster	Monica	FAO	Economist, OER
Segrado	Chiara	FCDO	Focal Point in Rome
Snow	Michelle	USAID	Senior Humanitarian Advisor

Last name	First name	Institution/agency	Role
Spano	Federico	FAO	Social Policy Officer, ESP
Thomas	Laurent	FAO	Special Representative of the Director General, ODG
Thomas	Philippe	DG DEVCO	Head of Sector, Food Crisis
Virchenko	Angelina	FAO - Cluster	Information Management for HDP Activities Mapping Specialist
Wouters	Fleur	FAO	Deputy Director, OER
Zachary	Austin	World Bank	Economist, Food and Nutrition Security Team

Appendix 2. Evaluation matrix

Evaluation question / subquestion	Indicators / judgement criteria	Lit	KII	Case study	Survey
1. Relevance of the GNAFC Partnership Programme					
1.1 Does the programme logic and assumptions identify the most appropriate pathways to building resilience to food crises?	Was the design of the GNAFC Partnership Programme underpinned by a robust analysis of gaps and needs?				
	What are the consequences of existing gaps in analysis, knowledge and coordination?				
	What other complementary actions are needed – alongside improved information and coordination – to improve decision-making on responding to food crises?				
1.2 To what extent do the thematic areas in the programme design build on FAO comparative advantages in building resilience to food crises?	Alignment of improved food security, resilience and risk analyses with FAO mandate and comparative advantage.				
	Comparative advantage of other agencies in these areas.				
	Missed opportunities for FAO to address other associated areas of comparative advantage				
2. Effectiveness of the GNAFC Partnership Programme					
2.1 Has the GNAFC Partnership Programme enhanced analysis for improved decision-making?	Changes in the availability and quality food security, resilience and risk analyses to support decision-making at different levels.				
	Integration of gender and inclusion in analyses				
	Coordination with other agencies to minimize duplication of effort and maximize synergies.				
	Factors enabling and inhibiting progress.				
	Continuing gaps.				
2.2 Has the GNAFC Partnership Programme improved evidence-based knowledge of solutions to food crises?	Strengthened capacities to capture learning on effective responses to food crises.				
	Extent to which key learnings on responses were successfully captured and disseminated.				
	Coordination with other agencies to minimize duplication of effort and maximize synergies.				
	Factors enabling and inhibiting progress.				
	Continuing knowledge gaps.				
2.3 Has the GNAFC Partnership Programme built consensus and coordinated responses to food crises?	Achievement in establishing coordination platforms and events at global, regional and country level.				
	Factors enabling and inhibiting progress.				
3. Impact of the GNAFC Partnership Programme					
3.1 To what extent has the GNAFC Partnership Programme contributed to building resilience to food crises?	Contribution of improved analyses to changes in policy and programming.				•
	Contribution to an enhanced level of coordination and harmonization of initiatives in support to food security.				•

Evaluation question / subquestion	Indicators / judgement criteria	Lit	KII	Case study	Survey
	Learnings contributing to the upscaling or replication of interventions.				•
	Contribution to strategic linkages between humanitarian, development and peace work.				•
	Feasibility of developing a typology of crises and matching response options as a decision-making tool.				•
3.2 Were synergies between the GNAFC Partnership Programme components exploited to enhance this contribution?	Evidence of synergies between programme components.				
	Synergies with other FAO programmes.				
	Missed opportunities for synergies.				
3. Sustainability of the GNAFC Partnership Programme					
4.1 To what extent have relevant capacities for analysing and planning strategies and programmes to build resilience to food crises been institutionalized in FAO?	Contribution to improved FAO analytical capacities.				
	Factors enabling or inhibiting institutionalization.				
	Sustainability of changes.				
4.2 To what extent have relevant capacities for analysing and planning strategies and programmes to build resilience to food crises been institutionalized among partners, including governments?	Contribution to the institutionalization of analyses, knowledge management and coordination within national systems.				
	Positive and negative consequences of institutionalization.				
	Sustainability of changes.				

Appendix 3. Additional information on GNAFC components

1. **Component 1** served as the analytical dimension of the GNAFC Partnership Programme and supported the overall improvement of the quality of food security, resilience and risk analyses, with a particular focus on strengthening local capacities and institutionalization and improving communication of results to decision-makers. At a global level, work under Component 1 has primarily revolved around capacity development, quality control of analytical products, technical development of analytical tools and methodologies, including the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) and Cadre Harmonisé Analysis, Early Warning Early Action (EWEA), Resilience Index Measurement and Analysis (RIMA) and conflict and context analysis.
2. Many of the activities that fall under Component 1 were developed during the preceding INFORMED programme, which took place from May 2015 until December 2019. Having run concurrently to the GNAFC Partnership Programme in 2019, selected INFORMED activities were absorbed into the Partnership Programme.
3. A number of global public goods were produced under this Component, including the annual “Global Report on Food Crises”, the “Hunger Hotspots” reports, “Financing Flows and Food Crises Report”, the “Early Warning Early Action reports on food security and agriculture” and the “Monitoring Food Security in Countries with Conflict Situations” updates. Component 1 has also supported the production of other ad hoc analyses, such as country-level analyses on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on sustainable peace and resilience livelihoods.
4. Through **Component 2**, context-specific country-level investments modelled on the European Union Pro Resilience Action approach have aimed at generating knowledge on a set of typologies of crisis as well as effective response options that can be replicated by relevant national, regional and global stakeholders. Investments sought to generate practical solutions to food crises through ten interventions: Yemen, Cuba, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Myanmar, the Sahel (the Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso), Somalia, South Sudan, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Palestine.
5. The country investments supported diverse objectives, including i) strengthening institutions; ii) strengthening information management; iii) enhancing beneficiaries’ skills and learning; and iv) supporting household livelihoods. The main expected outcome of Component 2 was the production of evidence-based knowledge answering global and country specific learning questions (see Appendix 4). This process was supported through GNAFC Partnership Programme investments in monitoring, evaluation, accountability and learning (MEAL) capacities.
6. **Component 3** focused on ensuring that analyses and knowledge generated under Components 1 and 2 become drivers of policy change across multiple levels. This included activities related to joint coordination at country and global level, as well as knowledge management and learning. This has involved enhancing the use of analyses, such as the Global Report on Food Crises, within a range of existing high-level initiatives and other bodies to facilitate more coordinated and effective global responses to food crises.
7. Component 3 promoted the GNAFC Partnership Programme’s efforts to develop and scale-up sustainable solutions to food crises in line with the HDP nexus, with knowledge management and learning activities implemented through the FAO-led Knowledge Sharing Platform on Resilience (KORE) linked to work in a learning-focused monitoring, evaluation and learning approach. This Component aimed to inform the development of response guidelines and toolkits to help optimize investments at country level, including working through the Food Security Cluster.

8. Geographically, the GNAFC Partnership Programme has global coverage in terms of global public goods produced and coordination mechanisms supported. However, support for improving capacity in food security and resilience analyses, and in country-level investments, was concentrated in contexts of protracted and acute crises in four regions: the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Near East and Latin America, with provision of technical support to approximately 40 countries, and specific country-level investments in 12 countries.

Appendix 4. GNAFC Partnership Programme learning questions

1. The initial global learning questions were set out in the programme document. These covered topics including the effectiveness of interventions in improving resilience, the relevance of the New Ways of Working, country-level capacity for designing and implementing resilience policies and programming, the policy uptake of analyses, and coordination mechanisms at country level to promote sustainable solutions to food crises. These preliminary global learning questions were significantly revised and narrowed down within the inception report to three core global questions, which were aligned with the stated programme objectives discussed above:
 - i. What interventions across the HDP nexus improve/strengthen the capacity of households to deal with and recover from food crisis-related shocks?
 - ii. Under what conditions are these interventions (or approaches) most impactful?
 - iii. To what extent do interventions at country level promote the HDP nexus? Which good practices can be replicated and upscaled?
2. Under the broad framework of the global learning questions, the country M&E staff developed detailed learning questions tailored to the individual country investments. These were initially developed during an initial M&E workshop held in Rome in 2019, with further minor revisions during implementation.
3. A mapping of the country learning questions against the overarching global learning questions is presented in Appendix table 1. In most cases (seven out of ten) country investments included contextualized questions on the extent to which the investments contribute to increased resilience. However, relatively few countries (three out of ten) included more specific questions that explored the factors influencing the level of success. Seven out of ten countries also included questions on the links with conflict. Given that conflict analysis was not consistently prioritized across the country investments (see section 3.2.3) there was a somewhat surprisingly consistent focus on the conflict dynamics within the set of country learning questions.
4. Most countries also included bespoke learning questions which do not appear to be closely related to the global learning questions and address more localized interests and priorities. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ethiopia, the learning questions appeared to be primarily driven by the country priorities rather than aligning to the global questions.
5. Beyond guiding the general framing of questions, the relationship between the global and country learning questions remained somewhat vague. It was unclear if or how the “answers” to the country questions were expected to inform the answers to the global questions or if the global questions were to be “answered” by drawing directly on the various sources of evidence.

Appendix table 1. Relationship of the learning questions at global and country levels

Global Learning Questions	What interventions across the HDP nexus improve/strengthen the capacity of households to deal with and recover from food crisis-related shocks?	Under what conditions are these interventions (or approaches) most impactful?	To what extent do interventions at country level promote the HDP nexus? Which good practices can be replicated and upscaled?	Other (country specific)
South Sudan	How does the Pastoralist Livelihoods and Education Field Schools (PLEFS) approach (integration of education with livelihood support) contribute to resilience of mobile pastoral communities and households in South Sudan?		Does PLEFS contribute to mitigating conflict in pastoral areas and how?	How does the PLEFS approach impact on the tradition and cultural norms of pastoralists in cattle camps?
Yemen		Within the context of Yemen, what factors make the cash/cash+ model effective to maximize the impact on food security and resilience?	To what extent does community governance result in a reduction of conflict over natural resources?	What is the role of conflicts over natural resources in driving current food crisis in Yemen?
Somalia	Within the context of riverine livelihood in Somalia, does the community-based farming system approach result in added value in building resilience at the household level?		Does community governance of irrigation result in a reduction in conflict over water resources? Does the higher-level governance result in reduced conflict over water resources between committees?	
Ethiopia	What is the appropriate livelihood package and delivery mechanism to ensure sustainable livelihoods?			What are the model and the minimum requirements for an effective disaster risk management mainstreaming in agriculture planning and budgeting at the regional level? What are the success factors enabling the adoption of IPC in Ethiopia?
Madagascar	How did the different approaches promoted in the project contribute to building household resilience?		What are the opportunities and limitations of the "Crisis Modifier" approach ³⁰ in the process of building resilience?	How does the "early intervention" approach influence household practices in the agriculture sector in the context of climate change?
Sahel		What are the success factors that enable the agropastoral information system in place to	How does the project integrate the challenges of conflict dynamics into its intervention strategy	

³⁰ Crisis modifiers are designed to be ring-fenced budget contingency lines, built into existing multi-year grants. These are set up to be released when agreed early warning triggers of emerging crises are met. The funding flows to early action activities to mitigate the crisis and/or provide a bridge until a humanitarian response arrives (START Network).

Global Learning Questions	What interventions across the HDP nexus improve/strengthen the capacity of households to deal with and recover from food crisis-related shocks?	Under what conditions are these interventions (or approaches) most impactful?	To what extent do interventions at country level promote the HDP nexus? Which good practices can be replicated and upscaled?	Other (country specific)
		contribute to improved resilience? How do youth and women's empowerment actions contribute to improving the resilience of these vulnerable groups in pastoral settings?	and how does it contribute to conflict mitigation and resolution?	
Myanmar	What is the contribution of project interventions, including the cash transfer programming to resilience?		What is the project contribution of project interventions in improving the social cohesion in the project villages / village tracts?	How has the project adapted and improved during implementation?
Palestine	How does the programme, in terms of contents and approach, contribute to promoting structural transformation (transformational change) as a tool for building resilience?		To what extent is the programme addressing the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus in the Gaza Strip unique context?	How does the programme promote self-learning processes, participatory approaches and capturing evidence from M&E?
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)				In the political, social and economic context in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, how has FAO been able to engage with the authorities at the national, regional and/or local level? Likewise, how has it managed to engage with the private sector, non-governmental entities, civil society and other UN agencies to harmonize intervention strategies for vulnerable rural families?
Cuba	What was the contribution of each intervention and/or the combination of interventions to improve the resilience of the local food system to disaster events and climate change?	What were the success factors and limitations?		How was the project integrated into national priorities for resilience of local food systems to disasters and climate change?

Source: GNAFC. 2019. *Partnership Programme monitoring report*. (Updated by KORE team, with categorization against global learning questions by the Evaluation Team). Rome.

Annexes

Annex 1. Myanmar country investment brief

http://www.fao.org/3/cd3888en/GNAFC_Annex_1.pdf

Annex 2. Yemen country investment brief

http://www.fao.org/3/cd3888en/GNAFC_Annex_2.pdf

Annex 3. Somalia country investment brief

http://www.fao.org/3/cd3888en/GNAFC_Annex_3.pdf

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